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Articles
Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech
CHRISTINA BOHANNAN*
Copyright law is a glaring and unjustified exception to the rule that the government
may not prohibit speech without a showing that it causes real harm. While the First
Amendment sometimes protects even harmful speech, it virtually never allows the
prohibition of harmless speech. Yet, while other speech-burdening laws, such as
defamation and right-of-publicity laws, require that the defendant's speech is likely to
cause harm, copyright law does not make harm a requirement of infringement.
Copyright law considers harm to the market for the copyrighted work as a factor in fair
use analysis, but harm is not always required and is so poorly defined that the concept
has become circular. Moreover, the defendant ordinarily bears the burden of proof to
show the absence of harm. As a result, courts often find liability for infringement, and
therefore burden speech, where harm is nonexistent or purely speculative.
Potential explanations for copyright's anomalous treatment are unpersuasive. Copying
involves speech as well as conduct, and the fact that copyrights are in some sense
property does not justify their aberrant treatment. Moreover, copyright's role in
encouraging creative expression does not obviate First Amendment concerns. Drawing
from cases holding that speech restrictions must be justified by an important or
compelling governmental interest, this Article argues that the First Amendment requires
real harm to the copyright holder's incentives in order to impose liability. It also
explores the types of harm that might arise in copyright infringement cases. It
concludes that demonstrable harm of market substitution is cognizable under First
Amendment principles. On the other hand, the First Amendment generally would not
permit recognition of harm to the reputation of copyrighted works, or, except in cases
of unpublished works, harm to an author or copyright holder's privacy, right not to
speak, or right not to associate.
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INTRODUCTION
Once largely ignored, the conflict between copyright law and the
First Amendment is now widely recognized' and even considered
i. Compare Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of
Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. II8o, ItII (1970) (arguing that the conflict is "a largely
ignored paradox, requiring exploration"), with Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use
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"intractable."' As copyright law prohibits more and more uses of
copyrighted expression, it necessarily encroaches upon the ability of
others to express themselves through the use of copyrighted material.
Many have advocated broader and more active First Amendment
protection for uses of copyrighted works, and with good reason. The
First Amendment is the constitutional bulwark against government
restrictions on speech, and its protection is robust. It "protect[s] speech
not because it is harmless, but despite the harm it may cause." 3 Indeed, it
even shields speech that encourages violent criminal acts, violates a rape
victim's privacy, or is harmful to personal reputation.4 Although the First
Amendment sometimes protects even harmful speech, it does not allow
the prohibition of harmless speech. The one glaring exception is in
copyright law.
The constitutional purpose of copyright law is to encourage the
creation and dissemination of expressive works by granting copyright
holders some control over their works. Yet courts frequently impose
liability without proof that the defendant's use of copyrighted material
caused any harm that could realistically affect those incentives. Mere
copying, not harm, is the touchstone for copyright infringement. While
courts generally consider harm to the copyright holder as a factor in
analysis of the fair use defense, it is not a strict requirement, and the
burden of proof is on the defendant to show the absence of harm.
Moreover, harm has been so poorly defined that the concept has become
circular. The failure to compensate the copyright holder for virtually any
copying may be said to "harm" the copyright holder, simply because the
defendant could have paid a license fee for the use. Finally, the damages
Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 546 (2004) (describing
conflict as "intractable" because of speech value inherent in acts of copying). See generally DAVID L.
LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, No LAw, at ix (2009); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S
PARADOX 3-5 (2oo8) [hereinafter NETANEL, COPYIGHT's PARADOX]; Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to
Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
354 (1999); Douglas J. Frederick, Note, Watching the Watchdog: Modifying Fair Use of Works
Produced by the Institutional Press, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1059, 1o63, 1071 (2002); Paul Goldstein, Copyright
and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom
of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 165, 167-68 (1998)
[hereinafter Lemley & Volokh, Injunctions]; Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48
UCLA L. REV. I057 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. I1(2001) [hereinafter Netanel, Locating Copyright]; Jed Rubenfeld, The
Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. i, 5-7 (2002); Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and
Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REV. 697 (2003) [hereinafter Volokh, Some Thoughts].
2. Tushnet, supra note i.
3. Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1321-23 (1992) (arguing
that the tradeoff between "harm-toleration and speech-protection is by no means inevitable" because
the beneficiaries of robust speech protection could compensate those who bear the burdens of that
protection).
4. See infra Parts I, V.
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provisions of the Copyright Act allow courts to award the plaintiff
defendant's profits or statutory damages-without a showing that the
defendant's copying has caused the plaintiff any real harm-and to assess
damages that are grossly disproportionate to provable harm.
Despite the obvious conflict between copyright law and the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court has rejected the plea for First
Amendment protection for most uses of copyrighted works. In Eldred v.
Ashcroft, the Supreme Court held that First Amendment scrutiny does
not ordinarily apply to copyright infringement cases in the same way that
it applies to other cases involving government burdens on speech.5
Rather, the Court relied on copyright law's own statutory doctrines,
including the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine, to
protect speech concerns in most copyright infringement cases.'
There are essentially three possible reasons for this unusual
approach to speech issues in copyright law. First, "copying" is not the
same as "speaking." As the Supreme Court said in Eldred, "The First
Amendment securely protects the freedom to make-or decline to
make-one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the
right to make other people's speeches."7 If copying is merely conduct and
not speech, then the First Amendment does not apply to copying.
Second, even if copying is speech, it might not be protected speech if it is
inimical to the speech-enhancing purposes of both copyright law and the
First Amendment. Because the Constitution's Framers intended
copyright law to be "the engine of free expression," copying that violates
copyright law also violates First Amendment principles.8 Thus,
"copyright's built-in free speech safeguards" might be sufficient to
protect speech concerns in copyright infringement cases.' Third, one
could argue that copyrights are property, and the First Amendment does
not require property holders to let others use their property for speech
IOpurposes.
Unfortunately, the Court's simplistic distinction between speaking
and "making other people's speeches" cannot support the analytical
weight it is being forced to bear. The use of copyrighted material has
substantial speech value to both the user and the public, whether or not it
is copied. Moreover, although the Court is probably correct that
copyright law encourages free expression to some extent, the scope of
copyright protection (in the absence of a harm requirement) is much
broader than is necessary or desirable for encouraging the production
5. See 537 U.S. 186, 218-21 (2003).
6. See id at 219-21.
7. Id. at 221I.
8. Id. at 219 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985))-
9. Id. at 221L
ro. See infra Part III.C.
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and dissemination of creative works. In addition, the nature of the
property right inherent in copyrights is fundamentally different from
other kinds of property in ways that matter a great deal for purposes of
the First Amendment. Indeed, it is because copyright law is charged with
encouraging free expression that the property rights it conveys should be
limited where necessary to achieve that purpose."
A wealth of excellent scholarship has examined the interaction
between copyright law and the First Amendment. The scholarship
attempts to describe the conflict between the two bodies of law, develop
new theories of the First Amendment or of copyright law to help resolve
the conflict, determine how copyright law should be classified in First
Amendment taxonomy, and delineate which uses of copyrighted material
constitute protected speech." Some of the most vigorous debates have
focused on whether copyright law is a content-based or content-neutral
speech regulation and whether nontransformative (verbatim) copying
should be considered speech." Yet none of this scholarship has explored
in depth the role that harm should play in reconciling copyright and the
First Amendment.
This Article argues that, given the speech value inherent in all kinds
of copying, copyright law must be subject to the same harm requirement
as other forms of speech regulation. Indeed, absent a harm requirement,
copyright law is probably unconstitutional as applied in many cases.
Under the First Amendment, neither content-based nor content-neutral
speech regulations are permissible except where necessary to prevent or
remedy harm to a sufficient government interest. As applied in copyright
law, the harm requirement would allow a finding of infringement only
where the copyright holder can show that the defendant's use is likely to
cause real harm to the copyright holder's ex ante incentives to create or
distribute copyrighted works. As such, the harm requirement would
allow copyright's restrictions on speech only when necessary to keep the
"engine of free expression" running. It would help courts identify and
eliminate cases involving false conflicts between the First Amendment
and copyright, that is, cases in which there is a speech interest in allowing
the defendant's use and no speech interest in prohibiting it. Under this
approach, all copying - transformative, verbatim, commercial, or
personal-ordinarily would be protected, except where necessary to
prevent harm to copyright's constitutional and statutory purpose.
Although direct First Amendment scrutiny is arguably the best way
to protect speech concerns in copyright cases, the Eldred Court
expressed a clear preference for dealing with First Amendment concerns
II. See infra Part III.
12. See infra notes 105-22.
43. See infra Part IC., notes 170--83 and accompanying text.
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through internal statutory doctrines such as fair use.' 4 Under this
approach, fair use and other statutory provisions can be substantially
modified to implement a meaningful harm requirement in infringement
cases.
The Article also attempts to define copyright harm according to
First Amendment principles. It identifies several possible types of harm
that might arise in copyright infringement and examines whether the
First Amendment permits recognition of those harms. First, it argues that
when a copyright holder proves market harm in the form of lost sales or
licensing fees, and such harm seems likely to affect the incentives to
create or disseminate copyrighted works, a finding of infringement is
consistent with First Amendment principles, unless the speech value of
the defendant's use clearly outweighs the harm. Second, it asserts that, in
light of the First Amendment concern with fostering a diverse
marketplace of ideas, courts may not recognize harm to the image or
reputation of a copyrighted work. Third, except with regard to the use of
unpublished works, copyright law probably may not recognize harm to
the copyright holder's right not to speak or associate. The First
Amendment encourages the defendant's use of copyrighted material
even-or perhaps especially-when those uses are ones with which the
copyright holder would not like to be associated. Fourth, a copyright
holder's assertion of harm to her privacy for unwanted publicity or
exposure of copyrighted works-again with the possible exception of
unpublished works-ordinarily will not be sufficient to allow suppression
of most uses of copyrighted material.' Finally, when there is no harm of
any kind, the First Amendment precludes a finding of infringement.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE ROLE OF HARM
The First Amendment provides robust protection of speech in order
to promote democratic self-governance,16 to enhance the marketplace of
14. See 357 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
15. See infra Part V.D.
16. Leading proponents of the democratic-process view argue that the First Amendment protects
speech primarily as a means to facilitate decisionmaking in self-governance. See, e.g., OWEN M. Fiss.
LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996) (stating that
central concern of First Amendment is to protect democracy by ensuring minimal control over public
debate, and broad protection of speech is even more important given dominant presence of
established media in political debate); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 93-94 (1948) (asserting that a broad protection for aggressive and critical speech is
necessary for democratic self-governance), CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH (1993) (arguing that the First Amendment is necessary to protect deliberative discussion of
government, in which all views, even extremist views, are tolerated). The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that a "central" purpose of the First Amendment is to promote democratic self-
governance by allowing people to speak out against government, see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 273, 275 (1964), and at this point "[t]here is little disagreement that political speech is at the
core of that protected by the First Amendment." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I209 (3d
i0o88 [Vol. 61:1o83
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ideas,' 7 and to protect rights of autonomy and self-expression.' 8 In a
conventional First Amendment analysis outside of the copyright context,
a court first determines whether the challenged law regulates speech or
merely conduct." If it regulates speech, then the court must decide
whether that speech falls into the category of unprotected speech. Even
if it does, however, the government may not make certain kinds of
distinctions regarding that speech without demonstrating a sufficient
governmental interest?' Content-based restrictions must be justified by a
compelling government interest and must be the least speech-restrictive
means of achieving that interest.22 Not surprisingly, content-based
ed. 2009).
17. The marketplace-of-ideas metaphor owes its origin to Justice Holmes, who famously said that
"the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The marketplace-
of-ideas theory "posits that the primary function of free speech is as a catalyst to the discovery of
truth." Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982). As either a
theory or metaphor, the marketplace-of-ideas concept has become pervasive in First Amendment law
and scholarship. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government
itself or a private licensee."); C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND.
L.J. 981, 982 (2oo9) ("It should. . . be noted as of the early 1970s,... virtually all First Amendment
scholarship and the dominant doctrinal formulations accepted some version of a marketplace of ideas
theory [which the Supreme Court has also adopted]."); Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The
Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1386-87 (2001) (discussing government's
role in correcting distortions in the marketplace of ideas); William G. Buss, Lighting a Flame Under
the First Amendment, 76 IowA L. REV. 871, 875 (1991) (reviewing STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990) ("[M]etaphors such as the marketplace of
ideas . . ."have power beyond any first amendment legalities."); Caroline Mala Corbin, The First
Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 942 (2009) ("The values
underlying free speech ... include creating a marketplace of ideas .... ); Laura A. Heymann, The
Public's Domain in Trademark Law: A First Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REv. 651,
664-65 (2009) (discussing relationship between First Amendment theories based on autonomy and the
marketplace of ideas).
18. Autonomy-based accounts of the First Amendment emphasize that speech protection is
necessary to individual freedom and fulfillment. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427
(1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but
also those of the human spirit-a spirit that demands self-expression."); C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN
LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989) (discussing how government rules structuring the media
environment threaten legitimate individual autonomy interests protected by the First Amendment);
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879 (1963)
("The right to freedom of expression is justified first of all as the right of an individual purely in his
capacity as an individual. It derives from the widely accepted premise of Western thought that the
proper end of man is the realization of his character and potentialities as a human being."). On a
somewhat related note, Professor Rubenfeld has argued that the First Amendment protects the
"freedom of imagination." See Rubenfeld, supra note i, at 4.
19. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that flag burning constitutes speech).
20. See, eg, United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1839 (2008) (discussing cases holding that
child pornography falls into category of unprotected speech).
21. See id. at 1844-45.
22. See, e.g., id. at 1840; Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 577 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
io89
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restrictions virtually always fail when subjected to such strict scrutiny.
Content-neutral restrictions are subject to a lesser but still demanding
standard of intermediate scrutiny." This level of scrutiny requires that
the speech restrictions be justified by an important governmental interest
and narrowly tailored to serve that interest.24
The harm caused by the speech plays a central role in making these
determinations. Generally speaking, the unprotected-speech category is
reserved for speech that is obviously harmful, including speech that
defames another's reputation," violates rights of privacy or publicity, 6 or
incites unlawful action or retaliation.' The governmental interest in
restricting speech is to prevent or remedy harms allegedly caused by the
speech. The greater the harm, the stronger the government's interest is in
prohibiting or regulating the speech that causes it. Thus, the line between
harm-toleration and speech-protection accounts for numerous cases
defining when speech is or is not protected by the First Amendment.2 As
the following discussion of First Amendment cases shows, the cases in
which courts must make these distinctions cut across many different
kinds of speech regulations and involve many different kinds of harms,
from public harms to private tortious and property harms. What these
cases have in common, however, is that they allow the government to
burden speech only if the speech is likely to cause real harm.29
One such category of cases involves the "clear and present danger"
test for speech that incites unlawful activity. In Schenck v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not protect
speech if it "create[s] a clear and present danger that [it] will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."30
Subsequently, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court reaffirmed
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
23. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518, 521, 526 (2001).
24. See id. at 529.
25. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 ('974) (discussing the defamation of a
private individual); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1964) (discussing the defamation
of a public figure).
26. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (holding that fighting words-
words of a personally insulting nature, uttered face-to-face, that cause an aggressive response-are
unprotected).
27. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
28. See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1321 (1992) ("The
capacity of speech to cause injury in diverse ways contends with the goal of strong free speech ... and
it is a commonplace that robust free speech systems protect speech not because it is harmless, but
despite the harm it may cause.").
29. It should be noted, however, that First Amendment scholars have debated the extent to which
harm to a governmental interest or private party is necessary or sufficient to justify restrictions on
various kinds of speech. See, eg., Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. I1I9,
121 23 (1989) (arguing that freedom of speech cannot be merely a "minimal principle of liberty" that
is protected except where necessary to prevent harm caused by speech).
30. 249 U.S. 47' 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (explaining that just as the First Amendment would not
[Vol. 61: io83i090
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that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.3'
The Brandenburg test thus requires an intent and likelihood to cause
imminent illegal and harmful action.32 It remains the most influential
decision on point today, with subsequent Supreme Court cases applying
the same test.
A couple of years after Brandenburg, the Court decided New York
Times Co. v. United States (the Pentagon Papers case).34 There, the Court
refused to grant a prior restraint against the New York Times's
publication of classified government documents regarding United States
involvement in Vietnam.35 The fact that the New York Times was printing
material belonging to others, or "making other people's speeches," did
not seem particularly important to the Court.36 What mattered was that
the government was requesting a prior restraint on speech where there
was no convincing evidence that any real harm would occur. Although
the nature of the harm alleged by the government (harm to national
security) was weighty, the fact of harm was speculative.3 7 Thus, despite
the government's protestations that national security depended on
keeping the sensitive material secret, the interest in free speech defeated
the request for an injunction.
Similarly, "fighting words" are generally unprotected due to that
speech's propensity to cause immediate injury. In Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, the Court held that First Amendment protection does not
protect a person who falsely shouted "fire" in a theater, it did not protect persons who, during
wartime, circulated a leaflet asserting that the draft was unconstitutional and advocating its repeal).
31. 395 U.S. 444, 447 n.2 (1969) (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)). Dennis itself
would not seem to require a likelihood of harm if the magnitude of harm is great, such as in the case of
incitement to overthrow the government. See 341 U.S. at 500-05.
32. 395 U.S. at 447.
33. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902, 926-29 (1982) (holding that
NAACP official's statement, "If we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna
break your damn neck," was entitled to First Amendment protection because, under the
circumstances, such rhetoric was not proved likely to produce imminent lawless action); Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, o7-o8 (1973) (overturning conviction of individual who said, "We'll take the
fucking street later," because it did not advocate imminent illegal action).
34. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
35. Id. at 714.
36. See Tushnet, supra note i, at 563-64 ("[The New York Times] was not the author of the
Pentagon Papers, but that mattered not a whit when the government (which was the author) sought to
prohibit publication.").
37. See N. Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 725-26 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The entire thrust of the
Government's claim throughout these cases has been that publication of the material sought to be
enjoined 'could,' or 'might,' or 'may' prejudice the national interest in various ways. But the First
Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or
conjecture that untoward consequences may result.").
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protect "insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace."38 The Court explained that such speech is unprotected because it
is so likely to lead to immediate harm and is of little speech value.39 The
Court has subsequently narrowed the category of unprotected "fighting
words," however, allowing even more provocative speech to be
protected.40
Likewise, in private actions involving allegedly tortious speech,
courts will find the speech tortious and therefore unprotected only where
it is likely to cause significant harm. In defamation cases, the plaintiff
sues for reputational harm resulting from the defendant's defamatory
communication. Generally speaking, a communication is deemed to be
defamatory only "if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to
lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons
from associating or dealing with him." 41 As such, defamation claims
contain a built-in requirement that the allegedly defamatory statement is
likely to cause reputational harm." Although the common-law rule
sometimes has allowed juries to presume injury or damages from a
defamatory publication, that rule seems "headed for extinction,"43 as
some states have repudiated the presumption even where the
Constitution does not so require."
In addition to the common-law requirement that defamation is
actionable only upon a showing of a likelihood of harm, the Supreme
Court has imposed additional constitutional requirements in order to
protect speech in defamation cases of public officials. In New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, the Court held that the guarantees of the First
Amendment require
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.45
38. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
39. See id. at 572.
40. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 1348-49 (describing cases in which the Court has refused
to uphold fighting words convictions where words were "inherently inflammatory" but not "likely to
provoke violent response").
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
42. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1190 (2000) ("Harm to reputation itself, though often
not quantifiable, is the chief item for which recovery is permitted.").
43. See id. at 1130, 1189.
44. Gobin v. Globe Publ'g Co.. 649 P.2d I239, 1243 (Kan. 1982) ("[I]n this state, damage to one's
reputation is the essence and gravamen of an action for defamation. Unless injury to reputation is
shown, plaintiff has not established a valid claim for defamation, by either libel or slander, under our
law.").
45- 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
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There, the New York Times had run a political advertisement that
implicitly criticized Alabama law-enforcement officials.46 A police
commissioner established in court that the advertisement contained
misstatements about him that would have constituted libel per se under
Alabama law.47 Although the law allowed the newspaper to assert truth
as a defense, the Court held that "[a] rule compelling the critic of official
conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions" would chill
protected speech.48
The Court has taken different speech-protective measures in
defamation cases brought by private individuals. In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., the Court refused to apply the Sullivan "actual malice"
requirement in such cases, concluding that private individuals need and
deserve greater protection against defamation than public officials. The
Gertz Court opted for a rule that "allows the States to impose liability on
the publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood on a less
demanding showing than that required by [Sullivan]."so
Significantly, the Gertz Court held that states may allow private
individuals to recover for defamation without showing knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, but that the recovery must be
limited to damages for actual injury." The Court elaborated as follows on
the constitutional need for proof of actual harm:
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows
recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of
actual loss. Under the traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel,
the existence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication. Juries
may award substantial sums as compensation for supposed damage to
reputation without any proof that such harm actually occurred. The
largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there
is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of
liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of
First Amendment freedoms. Additionally, the doctrine of presumed
damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion rather than to
compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a
false fact. More to the point, the States have no substantial interest in
securing for plaintiffs... qratuitous awards of money damages far in
excess of any actual injury.
46. Id. at 258.
47. Id. at 262-63. Having held that the advertisement was libelous per se under Alabama state
law, the trial court instructed the jury that it should presume malice, as well as general damages. Id.
The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed, noting that "malice could be inferred from the Times'
'irresponsibility' in printing the advertisement," among other things. Id. at 263.
48. Id. at 279.
49. 418 U.S. 323, 344-46 (1974).
50. Id. at 348.
51. Id. at 348-49.
52. Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
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Thus, Gertz held that where a plaintiff does not show that a defamatory
statement was made with actual malice or reckless disregard for the
truth, she may recover damages only upon and to the extent of proof of
actual injury.53 Moreover, while the Court said that it did not need to
define "actual injury" given trial courts' substantial experience in dealing
with tortious harm, it did say that "juries must be limited by appropriate
instructions, and all awards must be supported by competent evidence
concerning the injury."54
In addition, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not protect a
television station from a right-of-publicity claim when it broadcast an
individual's entire "human cannonball" performance without
authorization.55 The Court's decision emphasized that "the broadcast of a
film of petitioner's entire act pose[d] a substantial threat to the economic
value of that performance."56 Thus, the Court explained that although its
precedent protected the news media's First Amendment right to report
on events, no First Amendment case had held that there was a right "to
broadcast or publish an entire act for which the performer ordinarily gets
paid."5
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the news agency did not need
to broadcast the performer's entire act in order to engage in protected
news reporting.5' On the other hand, the harm to the performer could
substantially interfere with the state's purpose in granting the right of
publicity. Interestingly, the Court compared this purpose with the
constitutional purpose of allowing Congress to grant copyrights. It
explained:
[The State's] decision to protect petitioner's right of publicity here
rests on more than a desire to compensate the performer for the time
and effort invested in his act; the protection provides an economic
incentive for him to make the investment required to produce a
performance of interest to the public. The same consideration
underlies the patent and copyright laws long enforced by this
Court.... "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
'Science and useful Arts."'
53. Id. at 348-50.
54. Id. at 350.
55. 433 U.S. 562, 565-66, 575 (1977).
56. Id. at 575.
57. Id. at 574. Noting that the television station had appropriated "the very activity by which the
entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place?" the Court explained that cases like this one
present the strongest argument for a right of publicity. See id. at 576.
58. Id. at 576-78.
59. Id. at 576 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (x954)).
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Clearly, harm to the performer-of a nature and extent likely to
impair the government's purpose in granting the right of publicity-
played a crucial role in the Court's decision that the First Amendment
did not trump the right-of-publicity claim. The Court believed, perhaps
wrongly, that there was a particularly strong potential for harm on the
facts of the Zacchini case. "[T]he broadcast of petitioner's entire
performance, unlike the unauthorized use of another's name for
purposes of trade or the incidental use of a name or picture by the press,
goes to the heart of petitioner's ability to earn a living as an
entertainer."6
Significantly, however, the Court held that the plaintiff would have
to show that he had in fact been harmed as a result of the broadcast in
order to recover damages.6' Indeed, the Court suggested that the plaintiff
would have to show net harm in light of the possibility that "respondent's
news broadcast increased the value of petitioner's performance by
stimulating the public's interest in seeing the act live." 62
By contrast, where the harm to the performer is minimal and does
not threaten to impede the purpose of the right of publicity, the
defendant's First Amendment right to speak looms larger. For instance,
in C.B.C Distribution & Marketing v. Major League Baseball Advanced
Media, L.P. (the fantasy baseball case), the Eighth Circuit held that the
professional baseball players' right of publicity did not outweigh the
defendant's First Amendment speech rights in creating and selling a
fantasy baseball game that incorporated the players' real names and
statistical performance records.6 3 As an initial matter, the court found
"no merit" in the argument that production of the game did not
constitute speech.64 Although the defendant's fantasy baseball game
appropriated the "names, nicknames, likenesses, signatures, pictures,
playing records, and/or biographical data" from the players, the court
held that the use of this information in "an interactive form in connection
with its fantasy baseball products" was "no less expressive" than the
"pictures, graphic design, concept art, sounds, music, stories, and
6o. Id.
61. Id. at 575 n.12 (petitioner would not be able to recover if he could prove that he suffered no
actual damages).
62. Id. ("It is possible, of course, that respondent's news broadcast increased the value of
petitioner's performance by stimulating the public's interest in seeing the act live. In these
circumstances, petitioner would not be able to provide damages and thus would not recover. But
petitioner has alleged that the broadcast injured him to the extent of $25,ooo, and we think the State
should be allowed to authorize compensation of this injury if proved." (citation omitted)). The Court's
requirement of net harm is relevant to copyright infringement cases in which the defendant's use of a
copyrighted work could increase as well as decrease sales. See infra Part II.A.
63. 505 F.3d 818, 82o (8th Cir. 2007).
64. Id. at 823.
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narrative present in video games" that the court had previously found
entitled to First Amendment protection.65
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit held that, unlike the facts of Zacchini,
the facts of the fantasy baseball case "barely, if at all, implicate the
interests that states typically intend to vindicate by providing rights of
publicity to individuals," including economic interests in protecting a
performer's right to make a living, providing incentives to encourage
performances of interest to the public, and preventing consumers from
being confused by misleading advertising." While the news agency in
Zacchini had taken the performer's entire act and broadcast it to the
public, the creators of the fantasy baseball game merely used the names
and statistics of the baseball players in a remote market. Thus, although
the players argued that the defendant's use harmed them individually by
depriving them of profits they otherwise might have obtained, the court
explained that the use did not harm the government's purpose behind
the law because it threatened neither the players' ability to make a living
by playing baseball nor any other interest underlying the right of
publicity:
[M]ajor league baseball players are [already] rewarded, and
handsomely, too, for their participation in games and can earn
additional large sums from endorsements and sponsorship
arrangements. Nor is there any danger here that consumers will be
misled, because the fantasy baseball games depend on the inclusion of
all players and thus cannot create a false impression that some
particular player with "star power" is endorsing CBC's products.
In all of these cases, the harm-or lack thereof-played a crucial
role in drawing the line between protected and unprotected speech.
While the First Amendment sometimes protects speech despite the harm
it causes, it does not allow liability to be imposed in cases of hannless
speech. To be sure, the case law does not always require proof of actual
harm in particular cases and will sometimes presume harm. But there
must be a showing that the type of speech at issue is likely to cause harm
significant enough to impede the government's interest underlying the
law. As such, the harm requirement serves a sort of gate-keeping
function, which helps to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on speech.6
65. Id. (quoting Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F-3d 954, 957 (8th Cir.
2003). In Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, the Eighth Circuit overturned a district court's holding
that video games were not a protected form of speech under the First Amendment. See 329 F-3d at
956.
66. C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., 505 F.3d at 824 (adding that although some courts recognize
nonmonetary interests in granting rights of publicity, there is little merit in these interests when they
are "compared with the interest in freedom of expression").
67. Id. at 823.
68. The common law of torts also protects the First Amendment by limiting tort claims that
would hinder free speech. For example, in intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, courts
protect speech by imposing liability only where the plaintiff can prove that the defendant's speech
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H. COPYRIGHT HARM AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Like the foregoing speech-regulating laws, copyright law burdens
self-expression by restricting what people can say and write.t Yet, while
courts are generally vigilant in using the First Amendment to protect free
speech in other types of cases, they almost never apply the First
Amendment in copyright law cases. In Eldred, the Court refused to apply
First Amendment scrutiny in a facial challenge to the Copyright Term
Extension Act, relying instead on copyright's "traditional contours," such
as fair use, to protect freedom of speech. 0 Likewise, courts have almost
uniformly rejected as-applied First Amendment scrutiny in individual
copyright infringement cases." As a result, although the governmental
interest behind copyright law is to encourage the creation and
dissemination of creative works, courts frequently find against the
defendant's use (thereby prohibiting the defendant's speech) without
real proof that the use has harmed the copyright holder in a way that
would be likely to reduce a copyright holder's incentives.
This section makes the theoretical and doctrinal case for requiring
harm as an element of copyright infringement in order to satisfy First
caused "severe emotional distress." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 46 (1965). The Comments
to the Restatement explain that proof of serious harm is required in order to make room for freedom of
speech, even when that speech is not particularly valuable:
The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances,
petty oppressions, or other trivialities.... There is no occasion for the law to intervene in
every case where some one's [sic] feelings are hurt. There must still be freedom to express
an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through which irascible tempers
may blow off relatively harmless steam.
Id. § 46 cmt. d.
69. See, e.g., Lemley & Volokh, Injunctions, supra note i; Lessig, supra note x; Netanel, Locating
Copyright, supra note I; Nimmer, supra note i; Tushnet, supra note i; Volokh, Some Thoughts, supra
note i.
70. See 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (stating that so long as copyright law maintains its "traditional
contours," internal statutory doctrines will ordinarily be sufficient to protect speech concerns in
copyright law); cf Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F-3d 1179, 1184 (ioth Cir. 2oo7) (applying direct First
Amendment scrutiny in facial challenge to new provision of the Copyright Act where provision altered
copyright's "traditional contours" by allowing works that had entered the public domain to be
copyrighted).
71. See Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note i, at 2-3 ("To be certain, copyright's potential
for burdening speech has long been recognized in U.S. case law, legislation, and commentary.
Nevertheless, courts have almost never imposed First Amendment limitations on copyright, and most
have summarily rejected copyright infringement free speech defenses."). There are very few
exceptions in reported decisions. One of these exceptions involved a prior restraint. See Suntrust Bank
v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 165, iI66 (iith Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that the district
court's order granting preliminary injunction against publication of The Wind Done Gone, a parody of
Gone with the Wind, constituted "an unlawful prior restraint"). Another is a district court decision that
was affirmed on grounds other than the First Amendment. See Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder
Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978) ("Comparative advertising, as practiced by
defendant in the case sub judice, is in harmony with the fundamental objectives of free speech and free
enterprise in a free society."), aff'd on other grounds, 626 F.2d 5575 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Amendment concerns. Section A shows that neither the copyright statute
nor the case law currently requires adequate proof of harm to avoid or
minimize conflicts with the First Amendment. Section B discusses other
scholarly approaches to resolving the conflict between copyright law and
the First Amendment and argues that a harm requirement is a necessary
complement to those approaches. Section C shows that whether
copyright law is deemed a content-based or content-neutral regulation of
speech, proof of harm is required to satisfy First Amendment scrutiny.
A. THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT COVERAGE, FAIR USE, AND DAMAGES
Largely as the result of special-interest influence, the Copyright Act
grants copyright holders very broad control over uses of their
copyrighted works." Unlike most torts and statutory causes of action, the
Copyright Act does not require proof of harm as an element of the prima
facie case. Rather, mere copying constitutes the statutory wrong."
Moreover, prima facie infringement generally requires a low threshold of
copying, and courts do not take into account the differences between the
two works, such as the new material that the defendant has added.
Indeed, copyright holders are given rights not only over copying their
own original works, but also over any derivative works that "modify,
transform, or adapt" the original work in any way.74 Thus, copying
constitutes prima facie infringement even if the nature, extent, or
circumstances surrounding the copying make harm to the copyright
holder unlikely.7 5
72. See Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 567, 581-92
(2005) ("[T]he [1976] Copyright Act reflects all of the hallmark characteristics of a special-interest
statute [including that] the benefits of broad copyright protection are concentrated in relatively few
individuals and industries, [while] the costs of that protection are spread among all potential users of
copyrighted works, which includes nearly the entire population."); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright,
Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 862-79 (1987) (describing in detail the
extensive influence of interest groups over the legislative process leading to the 1976 Copyright Act
and the broad copyrights that resulted from that influence); Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note i,
at 67-69 (noting that Congress's reliance on interested parties in drafting copyright legislation since
the 1909 Act has resulted in "an ever-expanding set of copyright holder rights," and that -[i]n recent
years, ... the growing economic importance of speech entitlements, to both industry and the national
economy, has brought copyright industry rent-seeking to unprecedented heights")- Stewart Sterk,
Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. II97, 1244-46 (1996) ("In the period leading
to the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress made it clear that industry representatives would have to hammer
out a bill acceptable to all interest groups. A new statute could only advantage all interest groups if it
expanded the scope of copyright protection-at the expense of the public domain-and that is
precisely what the 1976 statute did.").
73. See 17 U.S.C. § 5o1(a) (2oo6) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner. . . is an infringer of the copyright .... ").
74. Id. § xo6(2).
75. For instance, the Copyright Act prohibits making a personal copy of lawfully owned music,
even though the copyist is very unlikely to purchase an additional copy of the music if the prohibition
is enforced. See Jessica D. Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEx. L. REV. 1871, 1871-79 (2007) ("[T]the
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Once the copyright holder proves prima facie infringement, the
burden of proof typically shifts to the defendant to show fair use. 6
Section 107 of the Copyright Act requires consideration of four factors in
assessing fair use: (i) the purpose and character of the defendant's use,
including whether the use is commercial and whether the use is
"transformative" of the plaintiff's work; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work, including whether the work is unpublished and whether it is a
factual or creative work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
taken; and (4) the harm to the market for the copyrighted work.?
Although harm to the market for the copyrighted work is one
statutory factor that courts consider in fair use, it is not a strict
requirement. By emphasizing other factors in the fair use test, a court
may easily reject fair use even when evidence of harm is absent or merely
speculative. Moreover, what constitutes legally cognizable harm in
copyright law is not well defined. Indeed, there is a potential for
circularity in the definition: a copyright holder can always argue that the
defendant's use caused her harm (and therefore is not fair) because the
defendant could have paid her a license fee for any unauthorized use;
yet, if the use is deemed fair, then no payment is required.'" As Mark
Lemley has argued, "The result is to unmoor fair use from the traditional
rationale of market loss and to potentially make any use for which the
user could afford to pay into a use for which they must pay." 79
recording industry has sued more than 20,ooo individuals for making personal uses that can be
characterized as 'commercial' only by redefining commercial to mean 'unlicensed."'); see also Laura
Heymann, A Tale of (at Least) Two Authors: Focusing Copyright Law on Process over Product, 34 J.
CORP. L. 009, 1025 (2009) ("Except in the presumably rare event that a single individual would,
absent copyright law or technological protection measures, purchase more than one copy of a work,
the copying of a work for personal use, unlike the distribution of a work to others, implicates no
significant economic rights.").
76. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 51o U.S. 569, 590 (1994) ("Since fair use is an
affirmative defense, its proponent would have difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use
without favorable evidence about relevant markets."). This was not always the case. It appears that
when Justice Story first articulated the fair use factors in Folsom v. Marsh more than a century ago,
those factors were used to assess infringement, not an affirmative defense. As such, it seems that the
burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show that these factors favored finding infringement. See infra
notes 250-53; see also Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U.
L. REV. 969, 975-77 (2oo7).
77. See 17U.S.C.§ §107.
78. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 1996);
Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 6o F.3d 913, 929 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Bohannan, supra note 76,
at 978; Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
185, 190 (2007).
79. See Lemley, supra note 78. This circularity has an effect not only on individual copyright
cases, but on the scope of copyright protection generally. See Christina Bohannan & Herbert
Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust Reformation and Harm, B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 20lo) (manuscript at
56), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1377382 ("The effects of this
circularity are far-reaching. It causes risk-averse users to obtain licenses even when they are
unnecessary, and then the existence of those licenses tends to reify the notion that the right to control
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Uncertainty in the scope of fair use is likely to cause a chilling effect
on speech, as people might fear that even a small amount of harmless
copying could expose them to liability." Thus, authors creating works
such as books and documentaries are likely to forgo the use of reduced-
size art images, video clips, and short samples of music lyrics that would
enhance their works because of the time, money, and hassle involved in
getting permission. Moreover, even if the author is willing to gamble on
fair use, publishers and other intermediaries often refuse to rely on it and
require the author either to obtain clearance or remove the questionable
material. For instance, a law school professor wishing to use small black
and white reproductions of large color paintings in a book about the First
Amendment's treatment of art has been required by his publisher either
to obtain permission or remove the images entirely, despite having cited
cases to the publisher indicating that his use would be deemed fair.
In applying the copyright statute, courts do not limit copyright
infringement to copying that is likely to harm the copyright holder's
incentives to create and distribute works. For instance, in Castle Rock
Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., the defendant produced
trivia books based on the Seinfeld television show.t' The defendant
created its own questions and answers regarding the events and
characters on the show.8' The court acknowledged evidence showing that
the producers of Seinfeld had no intention of entering the trivia book
market.84 Yet, the court held that the defendant's trivia book was
infringing because the defendant copied the plaintiff's copyrighted
material, and copyright law should "respect" the plaintiff's choice not to
enter that market. Thus, the court essentially assumed that the
such uses exists."); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, i 16
YALE L.J. 882, 884 (2007) ("[T]he practice of licensing within gray areas eventually makes those areas
less gray, as the licensing itself becomes the proof that the entitlement covers the use.").
8o. See Robert Kasunic, Preserving the Traditional Contours of Copyright, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARts
397, 403-04 (20o7) ("The uncertainty of the fair use defense, at a minimum, forces users toward a
minimalist approach even if First Amendment interests support more expansive use."); Remarks of
Joseph Liu in Symposium Panel Discussion, Copyright and Freedom of Expression, 30 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 319, 324 (2007) ("Now this vagueness, this uncertainty, can be expected to have a chilling effect
on forms of creative expression that build on other works, because there can be a lot of substantial
uncertainty surrounding whether something is really fair use . . . .").
81. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, A Tale of Copyright (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (chronicling experience writing a book on art and the Constitution in which publishers
refused to rely on several fair use cases that supported author's use of reduced-size art images in
scholarly work).
82. 150 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1998).
83. Id.
84. Id. at i45.
85. Id. at 146 (following the lower court's reasoning that the constitutional purpose of the
Copyright Act, promoting progress in the arts, would not be served if artists were denied monopoly
rights over derivative works "merely because they made the artistic decision not to saturate those
markets with variations of their original" (quoting Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc.,
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copyright holder was entitled to control any and all copying of the work,
even if the defendant's copying did not make the copyright holder any
worse off than it would have been otherwise.
Along the same lines, in Ty, Inc. v. West Highland Publishing, the
court enjoined the defendant's use of copyrighted photographs based on
nothing more than speculation that the defendant's use might cause some
harm in the distant future.86 There, the defendant West Highland had
created a collector's guidebook, among other items such as a newsletter
and an encyclopedia, that included editorials and information on the
Beanie Babies collectible stuffed animals." Along with this information,
the book also contained photographs of the Beanie Babies, which the
court found infringed Ty's copyrights." The court granted a preliminary
injunction against the manufacturing and selling of the book, rejecting
West Highland's argument that the book was a transformative fair use
and finding that the book harmed Ty's market for derivative works. 9
Yet the evidence of market harm was purely speculative. There was
no proof that the book would supplant sales of the Beanie Babies stuffed
animals themselves; nor was it likely that the book would compete with
an ordinary book of Beanie Babies photographs. Moreover, Ty would
not have been in a position to exploit the market for a book of impartial
assessments of the collectibles. Thus, there was no harm to markets that
the plaintiff might reasonably have exploited. Rather, the court merely
speculated that Ty might suffer some harm in the distant future. The
court observed, "By recurring shortages, Ty seeks to maintain the
enormous demand and popularity of Beanie Babies for as long as
possible, and consequently seeks to avoid overexposure or market
saturation."' Therefore, the court concluded that the defendant's
"derivative works could have a negative long-term effect on the market
for Ty's works by destroying the marketing image Ty has carefully
created for its products."9' But such speculative evidence of harm should
not be sufficient to justify a finding of infringement, much less a
preliminary injunction suppressing the defendant's speech.
955 F. Supp. 260, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1997))).
86. No 98-C-4o91, 1998 WL 698922, at *15-16 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1998).
87. Id. at *13.
88. Id. at *9-
89. Id. at *15-16 (holding that each of the four fair-use factors weighed against finding fair use in
this case, since (x) the defendant's use was commercial in nature, (2) Ty's Beanie Babies were creative
works, (3) the defendant copied more than was necessary to achieve its purpose, and (4) the
defendant's products harmed Ty's potential derivative market).
90. Id. at *16.
91. Id. The Court discounted the defendant's argument that its products positively impacted the
market for Ty's Beanie Babies, calling the assertion "unsupported" and "short-sighted," id., and
noting that ly could recover a license fee even if the defendant's products increased demand for
Beanie Babies, id. at *I6 n-13.
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Similarly, in Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document
Services, the Sixth Circuit held that a copyshop's preparation of
coursepack copies for college classes was infringing. There, the speech
value of the copying was obvious, because the copying directly
contributed to a more educated citizenry. As Judge Ryan observed in
dissent, "Society benefits when professors provide diverse materials that
are not central to the course but that may enrich or broaden the base of
knowledge of the students." What is more, there was no apparent harm
to the copyright holders to justify the speech restriction. The publishers
did not market compilations of their own, and the record contained
declarations from several professors indicating that they would not have
assigned the full works regardless of whether the copying was allowed."
Thus, as Judge Merritt pointed out in dissent, it was mere speculation on
the part of the copyright holders that the copying harmed them in any
way:
[P]laintiffs here have failed to demonstrate that the photocopying done
by defendant has caused even marginal economic harm to their
publishing business. . .. The facts demonstrate that it is only wishful
thinking on the part of the publishers that the professors who assigned
the works in question would have directed their students to purchase
the entire work if the excerpted portions were unavailable for
copying....
The use complained of by plaintiffs here has been widespread for
many years and the publishers have not been able to demonstrate any
significant harm to the market for the original works during that time.
The court did not make any findings on whether granting the
copyright holders control over the market for coursepack copying was
necessary to encourage them to create and disseminate their copyrighted
works. Rather, it simply made the obvious point that the copyright
holders would value the revenue stream that would flow from these
uses.96 And even assuming that the market for coursepacks generally
provides important incentives to copyright holders, the court did not
require proof showing that these particular professors would have paid
the required license fee rather than forgo using the works altogether. As
such, the court restricted speech without determining that the speech was
likely to cause any meaningful harm.
Finally, the damages provisions of the Copyright Act allow courts to
award damages based on (i) actual harm to the copyright holder and any
92. 99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
93. See id at 1404 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 1409.
95. See id. at 1396 (Merritt, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1409 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (asserting that
harm to the publishers should be proved, not presumed).
96. See id. at 1383 (majority opinion); id. at 1397 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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additional profits of the defendant, or (2) a statutory damages amount.97
Courts have interpreted these provisions as allowing damages based
purely on defendant's profits or on a statutory amount without any
showing of actual harm.9 As a result, damages awards may deter speech
absent any proof that the defendant's use would diminish an ordinary
copyright holder's incentives to create or distribute copyrighted works.
For instance, in Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had suffered no demonstrable harm
from the defendant MGM hotel's use of a small amount of plaintiff's
music in performances of a variety show at the hotel." The lower court
"found that plaintiffs 'failed to establish any damages attributable to the
infringement,""'" and the appellate court concluded that "the district
court was not clearly erroneous in finding that plaintiffs' theory of
damages was uncertain and speculative."' The Ninth Circuit explained,
"It is not implausible to conclude, as the court below apparently did, that
a production presenting six minutes of music from Kismet, without telling
any of the story of the play, would not significantly impair the prospects
for presenting a full production of that play."' 2
Given these findings, it is highly unlikely that the defendant's use of
the plaintiff's copyrighted music would have harmed the plaintiff's
incentives to create or disseminate the play or music. Nevertheless, the
court held that the defendant would have to pay tens and possibly
hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages based on profits it earned
from the use. Indeed, the court held that the lower court's assessment of
$22,ooo in damages seemed "grossly inadequate" in light of the hotel's
direct profits from the show and indirect profits from hotel and gaming
activities which could be attributed in part to the show.'" By imposing
substantial damages on these facts, the court discouraged a socially
valuable use of copyrighted material (and artistic speech) while
acknowledging that the use was unlikely to harm the copyright holder's
incentives to produce the original work.
97. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (20o6).
98. See, e.g., Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that plaintiff's actual
damages and defendant's profits are treated as separate categories, and "[t]he award of the infringer's
profits examines the facts only from the infringer's point of view"); Engel v. Wild Oats, Inc., 644 F.
Supp. 1o89, 1091-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that the availability of statutory damages is not limited
by either actual damages or defendant's profits).
99. 772 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985). Although the case was governed by the 1909 Act, the damages
provisions of the 1976 Act are the same on all relevant issues.
Too. Id. at 513.
iox. Id. at 514.
102. Id. at 513.
1o3. See id. at 5i8 (noting that the lower court's award of $22,000 in damages was less than one
percent of the defendant's net profit from the play, approximately $2,5oo,ooo).
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In addition, in applying the fair use and damages provisions, courts
do not take into account any increased sales or profits that the
defendant's use generates for the copyrighted work. Yet, in many cases,
the defendant's use helps the plaintiff's sales much more than it hurts
him, often by stimulating interest in the plaintiff's work."0 4 Where courts
fail to take evidence of increased profits into account, their assessment of
harm is necessarily one-sided and incomplete.
Because these findings of infringement and damages restricted the
defendants' ability to speak freely, the courts in the above cases should
have applied First Amendment scrutiny. If they had, they would have
assessed whether the government's interest in enforcing copyrights was
sufficient to justify the restriction on the defendant's speech. As we shall
see, where there is so little evidence of harm to a copyright holder's
incentives to create or distribute copyrighted works, there is simply not a
sufficient governmental interest to justify suppressing speech.
B. THE ROLE OF HARM IN FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY OF COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
This Article is not the first to argue that copyright infringement suits
should be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. While earlier writers
argued that First Amendment scrutiny is not necessary in most copyright
cases, 05 in the past decade several scholars have made a strong case for
it.' Ten years ago, Professors Mark Lemley and Eugene Volokh argued
that, because copyright law is a content-based speech regulation, many
preliminary injunctions granted in copyright cases constitute unlawful
prior restraints." More recently, Professors Yochai Benkler and Neil
Netanel argued (separately) that First Amendment rules regulating the
media should apply in copyright law, because like laws regulating the
media, copyright law regulates the production and use of information.
104. One noteworthy example was the British copyright infringement case against Dan Brown.
author of The Da Vinci Code, for his use of material from the nonfiction book Holy Blood, Holy Grail.
Following news reports of the litigation, sales in the United Kingdom increased by 745%, and
Amazon.com reported a 3500% increase. See Bohannan, supra note 76, at 1029 n.243 (citing Richard
Roth, Mining Da Vinci, CBS NEWS, Mar. 13, 2oo6. http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2oo6/03/
iolistening-post/mainl390534.shtml, and other news stories); see also Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292
F-3d 512, 518-19 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing difference between "substitutional" and "complementary"
copying); Bohannan, supra note 72, at 596-97 (discussing anecdotal evidence from Amazon-com
indicating that derivative works often enhance sales of the works on which they are based).
1o5. See Goldstein, supra note i (arguing that copyright law is mostly consistent with First
Amendment principles except in the case of enterprise monopolies); Nimmer, supra note i (arguing
that copyright's own statutory framework, especially the idea/expression dichotomy, provides most of
the necessary protection for speech in copyright law).
io6. But see David McGowan, Why the First Amendnment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy. 65 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 28I (2004) (arguing against First Amendment scrutiny of copyright law).
1o7. See Lemley & Volokh, Injunctions, supra note i, at 147.
io8. See Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note i, at 55-59 Benkler, supra note I, at 357.
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Both Benkler and Netanel relied in part on the Supreme Court's decision
in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), which applied
rigorous intermediate scrutiny to federal statutory provisions that
required cable television systems to carry local broadcast television
stations.0 9 Benkler argued that, as applied to copyright law,
This approach would begin with the assumption that government will
not, in the first instance, prevent anyone from reading or using this part
or that [part] of the information environment.... Departures from this
baseline must be limited to those instances where government has the
kind of good reasons that would justify any other regulation of
information production and exchange: necessity, reason, and a scope
that is no broader than necessary."o
Similarly, Netanel argued that just as cable's monopolistic control over
local television warranted rigorous intermediate scrutiny in Turner I, the
concentration of speech entitlements to content owners in copyright law
also requires heightened scrutiny."'
Other scholarship has attempted to mediate between the First
Amendment and copyright by delineating which forms of copying
constitute speech. For instance, in his book Copyright's Paradox, Netanel
argues that although copying, like most other voluntary conduct, can be
viewed generally as self-expression, it should not be viewed as speech
unless it "is meant and understood to be communicative.""2 Therefore,
he argues that transformative copying is communicative speech, whereas
"the lion's share" of "consumptive" copying is not."3 Similarly, Professor
Jed Rubenfeld has argued that the First Amendment protects the
"freedom of imagination," which includes "the freedom to explore the
109. 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
io. Benkler, supra note i, at 357.
iii. See Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note I, at 69 ("[W]here, as with copyright law, speech
entitlements are so brazenly and consistently dispensed to industry bidders and the consequent speech
burdens are imposed on the public at large, the First Amendment should require rigorous judicial
scrutiny."). In Eldred, the petitioners ran with this point, arguing that intermediate scrutiny should
apply to copyright laws just as it does to laws regulating the media. The Court refused to apply Turner
scrutiny, however, distinguishing between ordinary copyright law and the "must-carry" media
regulations that the Court held unconstitutional in Turner L The Court said that the Turner I case
bears little on copyright. The statute at issue in Turner required cable operators to carry and
transmit broadcast stations through their proprietary cable systems. Those "must-carry"
provisions, we explained, implicated "the heart of the First Amendment," namely, "the
principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs
deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.
537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003) (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 641).
112. NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX, supra note i, at 44-45 (arguing that to define speech as
including all self-expressive conduct would "conflate the right of free speech with an amorphous right
to liberty of voluntary action").
113. See id. at 46-47 (elaborating that file sharing and similar forms of personal copying should be
characterized as self-expressive conduct rather than as communicative speech).
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world not present, creatively and communicatively."" 4 Accordingly, he
argues that copyright law is unconstitutional to the extent it prohibits the
use of imagination to produce a derivative work or perform a
copyrighted work live."' By contrast, he says, "When copyright law bars
simple piracy, it does not punish infringers for exercising their
imagination. It punishes them for failing to exercise their imagination-
for failing to add any new imaginative content to the copied material."" 6
Yet, other writers have made powerful arguments that even pure
copying serves important speech goals. Volokh has noted that
republishing copyrighted works creates speech value both to readers who
could not otherwise have obtained the material and to the "infringer" as
a form of self-expression."' Likewise, Professor Rebecca Tushnet has
observed that "ordinary copying serves multiple speech values, from
simple access to self-expression to political persuasion."". She has
provided numerous examples of pure copying with significant speech
value and has argued that the emphasis on transformativeness has
"limited our thinking" about speech concerns in copyright law."' Indeed,
Tushnet has lamented that the speech value of copying makes the
conflict between copyright and the First Amendment nearly impossible
to resolve. 20 Although Professor David McGowan disagrees in regards to
the speech value of pure copying,"' he agrees that the conflict between
copyright and the First Amendment is difficult to resolve. He asserts
that, to the extent uses of copyrighted works do involve speech, speech
theory "does not supply a premise" that courts can use to strike "any
particular balance between authors and consumers, or between upstream
and downstream authors.""'
This Article does not argue for a particular theory of the First
Amendment that will reconcile copyright protection and free speech. All
114. See Rubenfeld, supra note i, at 38. Rubenfeld starts with the well-established premise that
"works of art are 'unquestionably shielded' by the First Amendment." Id. at 31 (quoting Hurley v.
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)). He argues that
traditional First Amendment theories based on democratic governance or individual autonomy do not
adequately explain art's protected status and proposes a theory of the First Amendment based on
protection of the freedom of imagination. See id. at 37-48.
115. Id. at 58 ("Current copyright law is unconstitutional in that it permits courts to issue
injunctions or grant damages in cases of derivative works and live performances. With respect to
derivative works and performances, copyrights act as prior restraints. They create a private power over
public speech that is unacceptable and tantamount to censorship. They penalize the exercise of the
imagination.").
iT6. Id. at 48.
117. See Vokokh, Some Thoughts, supra note i, at 725-27.
18. Tushnet, supra note x, at 546.
119. See id. at 537.
120. See id. at 546.
121. See McGowan, supra note io6, at 286 ("[F]ree riding is not a First Amendment value.").
122. See id. at 284-85.
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First Amendment theories, from democratic governance and the
marketplace of ideas to individual autonomy and freedom of
imagination, have logical force and explanatory power. But the lack of a
unified theory of speech protection does not stop courts from deciding
hard First Amendment cases. Outside of copyright, courts regularly
balance speech rights against other interests without the benefit of a
speech theory that can tell them exactly what the outcome should be. As
previously discussed, the harm caused by the speech plays a key role in
deciding such cases. Courts do not restrict speech unless there is a real
threat of harm to a government interest on the other side of the scale.
While excellent scholarship has explored the relationship between
the First Amendment and copyright law, none has explored in depth the
role that copyright harm should play in protecting speech. This Article
argues that, in light of the speech value of transformative copying and a
good deal of "pure" copying, copyright law must be subject to the same
harm requirement as other speech-regulating laws. Without a harm
requirement, copyright law unnecessarily suppresses copying that would
enhance democratic governance by increasing access to creative and
informative works. Copyright law also needs a harm requirement to
avoid unjustified intrusions on individual First Amendment autonomy
interests. As John Stuart Mill argued in On Liberty, "the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."'
Under the harm approach, we should ask not whether the First
Amendment requires a deviation from copyright law, but rather whether
copyright law requires a deviation from the First Amendment. All uses
of copyrighted material-whether transformative or verbatim,
commercial or personal-presumably should be protected except where
necessary to prevent harm to copyright's constitutional and statutory
purpose.
Indeed, as we will see in the following section, the absence of a harm
requirement renders the Copyright Act unconstitutional as applied in a
number of cases. Copyright law is either a content-based restriction
subject to strict scrutiny or a content-neutral speech restriction subject to
intermediate scrutiny."4 Significantly, although strict scrutiny is a more
123. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1978) (1859).
Professor Wendy Gordon has recently said that "the Millian concern has special resonance in the free
speech arena." See Wendy J. Gordon, Harmless Use: Gleaning from Fields of Copyrighted Works, 77
FORDHAM L. REv. 2411, 2428 n.65 (2009).
124. Because copyright law is not a "time, place, or manner" restriction and does not merely place
incidental burdens on speech, it is not subject to the deferential review applicable to those kinds of
speech restrictions. Cf United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (conduct regulations
imposing only incidental burdens on speech are subject to less demanding intermediate scrutiny that is
more deferential to the government's speech restriction); see also Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra
note i, at 45 (copyright law "imposes far more than an incidental burden on speech," which precludes
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demanding standard, both strict and intermediate scrutiny require (at a
minimum) that the government's interest in enacting and enforcing a
speech restriction is sufficient to justify the speech regulation and that
the speech restriction is not substantially broader than necessary to
achieve that interest. Assessment of the governmental interest requires
courts to consider the harm that the government is attempting to prevent
or remedy. Thus, courts do not simply accept the government's interest
at face value. Rather, they scrutinize the government's interest carefully
to see, among other things, whether that interest is implicated in the
particular case. They must determine whether the harm that the
government is trying to prevent is actually likely to occur on the facts of
the case.
In copyright law, the government's interest would be sufficient-
under either strict or intermediate scrutiny-only if the copyright holder
has suffered or is likely to suffer harm that will reduce her incentive to
create or disseminate the copyrighted work. The harm requirement
would also ensure that the speech restriction is no broader than
necessary to serve the interest in providing copyright incentives.
C. COPYRIGHT LAW AS CONTENT-BASED OR CONTENT-NEUTRAL SPEECH
REGULATION
Several writers have debated whether copyright law should be
viewed as a content-based or content-neutral speech restriction. Lemley
and Volokh have argued that copyright law is a content-based regulation
because liability turns on examination of the content of the copied
material. 25 In addition, Volokh separately has argued that copyright law
is content-based because it prohibits only speech that is "substantially
similar" to copyrighted expression, and because the fair use defense
privileges copying for certain purposes such as news reporting, parody,
and educational purposes.12 As such, he maintains that there is no
meaningful way to distinguish between fair use's "purpose and
character" factor and the Supreme Court's analysis in Regan v. Time,
Inc., "which held that a ban on photographic reproductions of currency
was content-based because it contained an exception 'for philatelic,
numismatic, educational, historical, or newsworthy purposes.',)127
On the other hand, Netanel has argued that while a content-based
characterization "is not entirely implausible," copyright is best viewed as
application of less rigorous form of intermediate scrutiny).
125. See Lemley & Volokh, Injunctions, supra note s, at 186.
126. See Vokokh, Some Thoughts, supra note Iat 703-07; id. at 698-99 ("[Intellectual property
laws] are practically significant and doctrinally complex speech restrictions, which deserve more
attention than the Supreme Court has so far given them.").
127. Id. at 706-07 (quoting 468 U.S. 641, 647 (1984)).
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a content-neutral regulation.12 He argues that the fact that "copyright
law is content-sensitive does not mean that it is 'content-based' within
the meaning of the First Amendment."' Specifically, he claims that
copyright law does not reflect an improper government motive to
discriminate against some forms of speech, which is the driving concern
behind applying strict scrutiny to content-based regulations.' That is,
the target of copyright law "is not the viewpoint, subject-matter, or even
communicative impact of the infringer's speech, but rather the
infringement's deleterious impact on the copyright incentive."' 3'
Accordingly, whether copyright law is content-based or content-
neutral might depend on whether the content-based designation applies
to speech regulations that distinguish on the basis of content or only to
those that discriminate on the basis of content. If content-based
distinctions are sufficient, then copyright law is a content-based law,
because infringement turns on examination of the content of the
defendant's speech.3 2 In assessing prima facie infringement, a court must
determine whether the defendant has copied an improper amount of
copyrightable expression from the copyright holder.' That
determination depends in part on whether the defendant borrowed
copyrightable expression or only uncopyrightable ideas. 34 It is
abundantly clear that applying the idea/expression dichotomy in a
copyright infringement case requires a serious examination of the
content of both the plaintiff's and defendant's works. Moreover, in the
many cases in which defendants have asserted fair use as a defense (as in
parody cases), infringement has depended largely on the content of the
defendant's message. If the defendant's message is to criticize, comment
upon, or add new meaning to the plaintiff's work-in other words, if it
128. Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note i, at 48 (arguing that the courts' almost categorical
refusal to apply First Amendment scrutiny to copyright law is wrong and that copyright law should be
subject to intermediate scrutiny).
129. Id.
130. Id. ("[T]he category of content-based regulation is defined and delimited by the proposition
that government may not generally use its regulatory power to disfavor speech because of the speech's
likely communicative impact.... [T]he government may not restrict nongovernmental speech in order
to suppress or favor a particular viewpoint or subject matter." (footnote omitted)).
131. Id. at 49.
132. Thus, the Copyright Act is unlike wiretapping statutes that are viewed as content-neutral
because they "[do] not distinguish based on the content of the intercepted conversations" but rather
based on "the fact that they were illegally intercepted." See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526
(2001).
133. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F-3d 267, 274 (6th Cir. 2009)
(discussing and applying substantial similarity test).
'34. See Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 462 F.3d 072, O77 (9th Cir. 2006)
(explaining that general ideas, plot lines, and scenes a faire arc not protectable elements of a
copyrighted work and that the court must "filter out and disregard the non-protectable elements in
making [its] substantial similarity determination" (quoting Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d
8x5, 8zz (9th Cir. 2002))).
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"transforms" the plaintiff's work-then it is much less likely to be
deemed infringing.'
Even if content-based restrictions apply only to laws used to
discriminate against some kinds of speech or viewpoints, copyright law is
capable of being applied in such a discriminatory manner.' 6 As discussed
further infra Part VI, copyright holders sometimes bring infringement
actions against the use of a copyrighted work that "tarnishes" the image
of the original work. For example, a photographer sued subversive
sculptor Jeff Koons for making a sculpture that attempted to ridicule the
banality of a photograph of a litter of cute puppies.'37 In addition, MCA
Music Company sued a songwriter who made a sexually humorous
version of the 1940s patriotic song Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of
Company B.' 38 The courts found infringement in both of these cases.
For present purposes, however, whether copyright law is best
characterized as content-based or content-neutral speech regulation is
relatively unimportant. Much ink has been spilled on that subject
already, with many good arguments proffered on both sides. Indeed, it
seems possible that copyright law could operate as a content-based
restriction in one case and as a content-neutral one in another,
depending on the nature of the two works involved in the particular
cases. Rather, the key point here is that either a content-based or
content-neutral designation would require a showing of harm to justify
the application of copyright law in individual cases.
First, if copyright law is a content-based speech restriction, it is
subject to strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny requires that the law must serve a
compelling governmental interest and must be the least speech-
restrictive means of achieving that interest. Significantly, in assessing
whether the government's interest is sufficient to justify a content-based
speech regulation, it ordinarily does not matter whether the speaker
could have avoided the regulation by expressing herself differently. In
First Amendment cases outside the copyright context, courts have
recognized the important difference between, as Mark Twain put it, "the
almost-right word and the right word."' 39 In Cohen v. California, the
135. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., So U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (transformative use
entitled to greater fair use protection); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 477-78 (2d Cir. 2004)
(same); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792. 8oi, 8o6 (9th Cir. 2003) (same).
136. See Rubenfeld, supra note i, at 6-7 (arguing that copyright law engages not only in content-
based discrimination but also viewpoint discrimination when it "enjoin[s] speech that borrows from a
copyrighted work unless [the speech] is 'critical' of that work").
137. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 3o8-o9 (2d Cir. 1992) (defendant's sculpture did not
constitute fair use).
138. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d i8o, 185 (2d Cir. 198') (defendant's song did not constitute
fair use).
139. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 450 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting J. BARTLErr. FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONs 527 (x6th ed. 1992)); see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (in
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Supreme Court concluded that individuals have a speech interest not
only in conveying their ideas, but in using their preferred words to
express those ideas. 40 There, the Court overturned Cohen's conviction
for breach of the peace, which he sustained for publicly wearing a jacket
that said "Fuck the Draft." 4' The Court explained that "words are often
chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force," and that it
could not "sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the
cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that
emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more
important element of the overall message sought to be communicated." 42
What is more, because changing even a single word alters the meaning of
a statement, the Court said that it could not "indulge the facile
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process."'43
The same is true in copyright law. People choose to speak through
others' words for a variety of reasons, and that choice affects the message
that is conveyed.'" The fact that a copyright holder might take offense at
another's use of her expression is no more dispositive of its lawfulness
than is the offense that some would feel at seeing expletive words on
another's clothing in public. In either case, the question is whether the
government's interest in prohibiting the speech is relevant and sufficient
in the particular situation.
In cases of content-based speech restrictions, the proponent of the
restriction bears a heavy burden to show a compelling governmental
interest to support the restriction. As the following cases show, the
proponent must demonstrate that the harm the government seeks to
prevent is real, significant, and likely to occur as a result of the particular
speech involved in the case.
In Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a Texas statute that prohibited desecration of the
United States flag with knowledge that the desecration would "seriously
trademark infringement case involving a defendant's use of a trademark holder's song or movie title,
court refused to limit the defendant's First Amendment right to use that title to situations in which
there were no alternative avenues of expression besides the use of protected material).
140. 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (197).
141. Id. at 17.
142. Id. at 26.
143. Id.
144. See Kasunic, supra note 8o, at 404 ("While it is true that the First Amendment does not
guarantee a person the right to make another's speech, there are times when the purpose of the speech
requires, or perhaps simply benefits from, the inclusion of another's expression in order to more
appropriately make a point or where the purpose is referential to the expression of another.");
Rubenfeld, supra note i, at x5 (rejecting the argument that the idealexpression dichotomy in copyright
law alleviates First Amendment concerns because, under cases like Cohen, the First Amendment
protects not only the communication of ideas but also the particular expression of those ideas).
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offend one or more persons."'4 5 In support of the statute, the State
argued its interest in preventing breaches of the peace.46 Although
preventing breaches of the peace can be a valid governmental interest in
some cases, the Court held that such a breach had not occurred and was
not likely to occur on the facts of the case.'47 As the Court explained,
"The State's position, therefore, amounts to a claim that an audience that
takes serious offense at particular expression is necessarily likely to
disturb the peace and that the expression may be prohibited on this basis.
Our precedents do not countenance such a presumption."'8 Rather, in
order to prohibit speech, a state must show a clear nexus-under the
particular circumstances at issue in the case-between the prohibited
speech and the harm that the government is trying to prevent. The Court
elaborated as follows:
[W]e have not permitted the government to assume that every
expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot, but have instead
required careful consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding
such expression, asking whether the expression "is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action." To accept Texas' arguments that it need only
demonstrate "the potential for a breach of the peace," and that every
flag burning necessarily possesses that potential, would be to eviscerate
our holding in Brandenburg.'4 9
Similarly, in the Cohen case, the Court found that the government's
interest in maintaining the peace was insufficient to justify the
prohibition on public profanity. While acknowledging that some people
might find the four-letter word on Cohen's jacket offensive, the Court
was unwilling to presume that it would cause a breach of the peace and
cited the lack of evidence showing that "substantial numbers of citizens
are standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may assault their
sensibilities with execrations like that uttered by Cohen."'o Moreover, in
the Gertz decision described above, the Court held that, in a defamation
case brought by a private individual, the First Amendment requires
proof of actual injury because "the States have no substantial interest in
securing for plaintiffs ... gratuitous awards of money damages far in
excess of any actual injury.""
145. 491 U.S. 397, 400 (1989).
146. Id. at 4o7-08.
147. Id. ("The only evidence offered by the State at trial to show the reaction to [the defendant]'s
actions was the testimony of several persons who had been seriously offended by the flag burning."').
148. Id. at 408 (footnote omitted).
149. Id. at 409 (citation omitted) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Brief for
Petitioner at 37, Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (No. 88-'55)).
150. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. IS, 23 (1970).
151. 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
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The Court took the same view in Zacchini, a right-of-publicity case
that the Court explicitly compared to copyright.' There, the Court held
that a state has a valid interest in regulating the defendant's broadcast
where "[t]he broadcast of the petitioner's entire performance, unlike the
unauthorized use of another's name for purposes of trade or the
incidental use of a name or picture by the press, goes to the heart of
petitioner's ability to earn a living as an entertainer."' Thus, the Court
indicated that speech regulation is appropriate where there is a strong
likelihood of harm to the State's interest in providing a right of publicity,
but not where harm to that interest is less certain or minimal. In addition,
the Court observed that the State could compensate the injured person
only for the actual net harm caused by the defendant's speech.'54
Second, if copyright law is instead a content-neutral restriction on
speech, courts must apply intermediate scrutiny to infringement cases.
Although there is some variation among cases regarding how courts
articulate the requirements of intermediate scrutiny,' content-neutral
speech restrictions must generally serve an important governmental
interest in protecting against harm caused by the prohibited speech and
must burden substantially no more speech than is necessary to achieve
that interest.
For example, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court considered
a state wiretapping statute prohibiting the intentional disclosure of a
communication with knowledge or reason to know that the
communication was obtained through unauthorized interception."' After
determining that the statute was a content-neutral restriction on speech,
the Court held that the First Amendment prevented its enforcement
against a radio host who broadcasted the communication over the air
after it was given to him by a third party."' The Court explained that
although the government's interest in "removing an incentive for parties
to intercept private conversations" would be relevant in a case against
the person who intercepted the conversation, the wiretapping statute was
not enforceable against a party who innocently received and published
the information."8s According to the Court, it would be an "unusual" case
if enforcement of the statute against a nonintercepting publisher of the
152. See 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) ("[T]he State's interest [in permitting a right of publicity] is
closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to
reap the reward of his endeavors and having little to do with protecting feelings or reputation.").
153. Id. at 576.
154. See id. at 575 n.12.
155. See, e.g., Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note i, at 35-36 ("[A] variety of tests, including
some explicitly denominated as intermediate scrutiny and some not, have been applied to content-
neutral speech restrictions.").
i56. 532 U.S. 514' 5 17-21 (2ool).
157. See id. at 526, 535.
i58. See id. at 529-32-
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conversation would have any effect on the incentives of the person who
intercepted the conversation.' The Court emphasized that the First
Amendment requires more than "mere speculation" that enforcement of
the law would serve the government's interest in the particular case, even
where enforcement of the law would be justified in other cases.'t Indeed,
the Court noted that "even the burden of justifying restrictions on
commercial speech requires more than "mere speculation or
conjecture."" 6 '
Likewise, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner II),
the Court considered the constitutionality of federal legislation requiring
cable television systems to allocate some of their channels to local
broadcast stations.162 The Court determined that these "must-carry"
provisions were content-neutral speech restrictions and therefore subject
to intermediate scrutiny.'6' In light of substantial evidence showing that
cable television providers had monopolies over local television
programming, the Court held that the government met the requirements
of intermediate scrutiny by establishing that it had an important interest
in maintaining or increasing consumer access to diverse programming
and that the legislation did not burden substantially more speech than
was necessary to further that interest. 6 4
Other scholars have argued persuasively that copyright laws are
analogous to these communications laws and should be subject to the
same level of scrutiny.'6' But Turner II is also important for how it dealt
with the harm that the government was trying to prevent. The extensive
record allowed the Court to "consider whether the must-carry provisions
were designed to address a real harm, and whether those provisions will
alleviate it in a material way."' 66 Thus, the Court did not merely accept
on faith the government's proffered interest in preserving the number
and diversity of programs to which cable subscribers had access, but
rather recited numerous findings in the record that showed vertical
159. See id. at 531-32. The Court also noted that, although certain rare occasions may justify a law
suppressing one party's speech in the interest of deterring another's criminal conduct, this was not
such a case. Id. at 530 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (involving distribution of child
pornography)).
x6o. See id. at 532.
161. See id. at 532 n.i (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173,
188 (1999)).
162. 520 U.S. 18o, 185 (997).
163. Id. (discussing decision in Turner 1).
164. See id. at 196-200.
165. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note i, at 446 (arguing that Turner's scrutiny should apply in
copyright law because the Turner Court's concerns with concentration in markets for information
production and exchange are present in copyright law); Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note x, at
54-59 (arguing that Turner scrutiny should apply to "both speech entitlement allocation in general and
copyright in particular").
i66. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 195.
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integration among cable operators and cable programming networks as
well as monopolistic control by cable providers over local subscribers.'
Accordingly, it found a real threat to local broadcasting and
communications policy generally.'
Thus, whether copyright law is deemed a content-based or content-
neutral speech regulation, the corresponding First Amendment scrutiny
requires the copyright holder to show that the defendant's use of
copyrighted material in a particular case is likely to cause harm sufficient
to reduce the copyright holder's ex ante incentives to innovate. The
copyright holder must show a clear nexus between the copying and a
reduction in those incentives. It is not enough for the copyright holder to
speculate that the copying could cause some lost sales in the future, that
similar copying could cause harm under different facts or circumstances,
or that the defendant's failure to pay a small license fee, if it became a
widespread practice, could eventually start to diminish copyright holders'
incentives.
Unfortunately, in contrast to the careful scrutiny of governmental
interests ordinarily given to both content-based and content-neutral
speech regulations, courts frequently find copyright infringement absent
proof that the defendant's use has caused or will cause harm to the
copyright holder's incentives to create or distribute a copyrighted work.
Indeed, by refusing to apply any First Amendment scrutiny in most
copyright cases, courts avoid inquiring into governmental interests at all.
Courts simply see copyright law as different from other forms of speech
regulation. The next Part will explore the reasons why copyright is
viewed as unique with regard to the First Amendment and will show that
none of these reasons justify copyright's exceptional treatment.
III. COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONALISM: WHY COURTS Do NOT APPLY FIRST
AMENDMENT SCRUTINY TO COPYRIGHT LAW
There are at least three possible arguments for why ordinary First
Amendment scrutiny does not apply to infringement cases under the
Copyright Act. The first is that copying is conduct, not speech, and is
therefore not subject to the First Amendment. The second is that
copying is not protected speech because copying is harmful to the speech
167. See id. at 197-213. The Court noted, for example, that '[o]nly one percent of communities
[were] served by more than one cable system," id. at 197, that sixty-four percent of new cable
programmers were vertically owned, id. at 198, and that local stations were failing at an
"unprecedented" rate, id. at 212.
168. Id. at 213. Interestingly, the four-Justice dissent would have required even more detailed
evidence showing that "the breadth of the must-carry provisions comports with a goal of preventing
anticompetitive harms." See id. at 232 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Although Turner II involved a facial
challenge rather than an as-applied challenge, the level of scrutiny regarding the harm sought to be
prevented is at least instructive in as-applied challenges to copyright infringement claims.
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interest in encouraging the creation and dissemination of copyrighted
works. The third is that copyrights are property, and the First
Amendment does not require property owners to allow their property to
be used for speech purposes. None of these arguments, however,
provides a valid reason for refusing to apply First Amendment scrutiny
in copyright infringement cases.
A. COPYING CONSTITUTES SPEECH
One possible reason that courts do not apply First Amendment
scrutiny to copyright law is that copying is not the same thing as
speaking. That is, although a message constitutes speech when the
original speaker expresses it, it does not constitute speech when the
copyist copies it. This might be what the Eldred Court meant when it
said, "The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make-or
decline to make-one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers
assert the right to make other people's speeches.""' Under this view, the
Copyright Act regulates primarily conduct, which does not trigger First
Amendment scrutiny.
Some scholars have made arguments in this vein. McGowan has
argued that "free riding is not a First Amendment value" and that the
Eldred Court "was right to imply that authors who do their own work
advance some free speech values that copiers do not.""o And forty years
ago, Professor Melville Nimmer claimed that the copying of other
people's expression is generally unnecessary to free speech and that the
First Amendment should be invoked as a check on copyrights only in
very limited circumstances.'71
In the years since Nimmer wrote, however, copyrights have
expanded dramatically."' The 1976 Act added a very broad derivative-
169. 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
170. McGowan, supra note ro6, at 286; see also supra text accompanying notes io5-xs.
171. See Nimmer, supra note I, at 1191-92.
It is exposure to ideas, and not to their particular expression, that is vital if self-governing
people are to make informed decisions .... To reproduce the "expression" of [the] ideas
may add flavor, but relatively little substance to the data that must inform the electorate in
the decision-making process. Such minimal substance, lost through the copyright
prohibition on reproduction of expression, is far out-balanced by the public benefit that
accrues through copyright encouragement of creativity.
Id. Thus, Nimmer said that the idea/expression dichotomy strikes a definitional balance with the First
Amendment by allowing the public to use the ideas contained in copyrighted works but not the
expression embodying those ideas. See id. at 1189 ("The market place of ideas would be utterly bereft,
and the democratic dialogue largely stifled if the only ideas which might be discussed were those
original with the speakers."). The Supreme Court later agreed that the idea/expression dichotomy
serves First Amendment values by keeping ideas in the public domain. See Harper & Row, Publishers
v. Nation Enters., 472 U.S. 539, 556 (5985).
572. See Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note i, at 4 ("Nimmer's conclusions might have been
plausible in 5970. But .. . [a]s copyright law has evolved over recent decades, copyright owner
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works right which, together with the right of reproduction, prohibits just
about any copying of copyrighted expression. 3 In addition, the term has
been extended to the life of the author plus seventy years, easily making
a ioo-years-plus term."' Perhaps as a response to this expansion, some
scholars have proposed a different definitional balance that would
privilege some copying of copyrighted expression. One such approach
suggests that transformative copying-in which someone borrows
another's expression but then adds new material or a new context-is
speech, while pure copying is not." This approach is consistent, at least
to a large degree, with the current view that copyright's fair use doctrine
protects transformative copying more than pure copying.', 6
Despite thoughtful attempts to distinguish among different kinds of
copying, First Amendment values cannot legitimately be raised in
support of fair use protection for transformative copying and against it
for merely consumptive copying.'7  Both the First Amendment and the
prerogatives have steadily become more bloated. This expansion ... has... imposed an increasingly
onerous burden on speech.").
173. See infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
174. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2oo6). In addition, renewal of the copyright is no longer required for
protection, even though under the old required-renewal system, approximately eighty-five percent of
works were not renewed. See William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in
the Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1640-41 (2oo4) ("Not only did renewal provide notice of
subsisting copyright, but experience with the requirement of renewal had established that works that
have no commercial value are unlikely to be renewed, thus increasing the size of the public domain.").
175. See, e.g., NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX, supra note i, at 45-46 (arguing that transformative
copying is communicative and therefore speech, whereas "the lion's share" of "consumptive" copying
is not); Remarks of Paul Bender in Symposium Panel Discussion, Copyright and Freedom of
Expression, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 319, 330 (20o7) (arguing that plagiarism is not "First Amendment
activity" and that the First Amendment applies only to those cases "that do involve expression of the
infringer"); Rubenfeld, supra note i, at 48-52 (arguing that the First Amendment protects the
freedom of imagination and is therefore implicated only where the user of a copyrighted work adds
new expression to the work).
176. See generally Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REv. IIO5, Iiii
(1990) (the justification for findings of fair use "turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the
challenged use is transformative").
177. As an initial matter, it is at least worth noting that there is no textual support for this
argument in the First Amendment itself. As Professor Melville Nimmer wrote in describing the
"largely ignored paradox" between copyright law and the First Amendment, the First Amendment
does not distinguish between different kinds of speech.
The first amendment tells us that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." Does not the Copyright Act fly directly in the face of that
command? . . .The language of the first amendment does not limit its protection to speech
which is original with the speaker, but rather states that Congress shall make "no law"
abridging freedom of speech ....
Nimmer, supra note i, at I18I (first alteration in original) ("Mr. Justice Black has said that this
reference to 'no law' means no law, without any 'ifs' or 'buts' or 'whereases.'" (quoting Justice Black
and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 553, 559 (1962))). Of
course, the Supreme Court has never adopted this absolutist view of the First Amendment. Thus,
despite the lack of support in the constitutional language, First Amendment case law is full of
distinctions among different kinds of speech. I argue, however, that the distinction between
II117
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution'78 favor not only the
creation of new expression, but also the dissemination of that
expression."' The reason for encouraging dissemination of copyrighted
works must lie in the hope that they will be consumed, that is, processed
or considered. It is only through consumption of these works that
copyright law can enhance the marketplace of ideas and democratic
governance, and a good deal of harmless copying is done in furtherance
of this consumption. As Rebecca Tushnet has argued, copyrighted works
saturate our culture and surroundings, influencing social and political
views and providing a vernacular for expressing those views. Thus, she
has said that "when moments of political choice do come, our responses
are shaped by the culture around us. As a result, freedom to participate
in shaping culture is an overriding concern of the democratic self-
governance view [of the First Amendment]."'"' Similarly, Volokh has
emphasized that copied speech has just as much value to listeners as
original speech."' Indeed, in many cases of copyright infringement, the
copied "work is materially more valuable to readers than the original
that they can't get, that costs too much, or that they don't know about."'8 3
Princeton University Press, the copyshop case described above,
provides a good example of how pure (nontransformative) copying can
further the First Amendment's goal of enhancing democratic self-
governance."' In that case, it was clear that neither the professor nor the
copyshop transformed the copyrighted works in any way. Yet, the First
Amendment value of such copying is obvious. Exposing college students
to literary, historical, and other kinds of works directly contributes to a
more educated citizenry, which in turn improves democratic self-
governance. The fair use provision of the Copyright Act recognizes the
value of copying for educational purposes, stating that "the fair use of a
copyrighted work, . . . for purposes such as ... teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use),. .. is not an infringement of
transformative and nontransformative uses of copyrighted material in speech is particularly
problematic, and that a harm requirement is a better way to resolve the conflict between copyright and
the First Amendment.
178. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
179. See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. I, 6-7 (1987)
(arguing that "copyright's purpose is best served by encouraging the distribution of works" through a
regulatory copyright regime, not by encouraging the creation of works through a proprietary copyright
regime).
18o. See Tushnet, supra note i, at 539-40.
181. Id. at 540.
182. See Vokokh, Some Thoughts, supra note s, at 726.
183. Id.; see also Tushnet, supra note s, at 565-66 (invoking the value of audience access to argue
that copying "promotes democracy by literally putting information in citizens' hands").
184. See 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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copyright."'' In applying the four fair use factors, however, the court
limited the availability of fair use for educational purposes.
The speech value of copying is also apparent under an autonomy-
based account of the First Amendment. Copying of copyrighted works is
a means of self-expression, as the copier surveys available works, chooses
those with which she identifies or disagrees, and copies the portions that
best capture her thoughts or feelings. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
explicitly held that choices in selecting which of others' speech to include
in one's own message constitutes protected speech. In Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, the Court held that
the choices of parade organizers in selecting who could participate in a
parade constituted protected speech."" Accordingly, the Court concluded
that state antidiscrimination laws requiring the organizers to allow a gay
and lesbian group to participate violated the organizers' First
Amendment right not to speak.187 Likewise, the Copyright Act recognizes
the expressive value of choices involved in the "select[ion],
coordinat[ion], or arrange[ment]" of preexisting materials by granting
copyright protection to compilations of such materials. 88
Under First Amendment case law, the issue of whether copying-or
any other conduct-constitutes speech turns on "whether [the] particular
conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First
Amendment into play."' 8 ' The Supreme Court explained in Texas v.
Johnson that conduct constitutes speech, giving rise to First Amendment
protection, when the conduct is accompanied by an "intent to convey a
particularized message" and "the likelihood [is] great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it.""
These elements are clearly met in many, if not most, cases of
copyright infringement. The intent and likelihood of conveying a
message are perhaps most obvious in transformative copying. For
instance, when the rap group 2 Live Crew writes a new, parodic version
of Roy Orbison's song Pretty Woman, the message is a rejection of the
185. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2oo6).
186. 515 U.S. 557, 572-73 (1995) ("Since every participating unit affects the message conveyed by
the private organizers, the state courts' application of the statute produced an order essentially
requiring petitioners to alter the expressive content of their parade."); see also Miami Herald Publ'g
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that newspaper's editing of speech of others for
inclusion in paper constituted protected speech under the First Amendment).
187. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559.
188. See 17 U.S.C. § 1ol (defining a copyrightable "compilation"). Further, even if the "speech"
component of copying is not obvious, such copying clearly implicates the freedom of association
because it provides the means for the copier to associate with another's ideas and expression. The
freedom of association is a fundamental right under the First Amendment, as it is "integral to the
speech and assembly protected by the First Amendment." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 1155.
189. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 41o-JI
190. Id. (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-Il)).
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banality and sentimentality (or maybe the whiteness?) of the original."'
Yet, such a message is often evident in cases of pure copying as well.
Surely the evangelist who reads the Bible aloud in a public place intends
to and does convey a message, even though he did not write the Bible
himself and did not add to it in any way. The same would be true if he
were to copy portions of the Bible in a written document and distribute
copies of the document at large. In that case, the Bible is in the public
domain, so the speech would be protected. With regard to copyrighted
material, although one might argue that some uses of copyrighted
material should not constitute protected speech, there is no reason to
treat copying of copyrighted material differently in determining whether
it constitutes speech at all.'92 Either way, the copyist is not the speaker
who originally generated the message. Thus, if a person reads aloud or
copies from Barack Obama's The Audacity of Hope in order to show his
support for the new President, he is engaging in speech, even though he
did not write that book himself.'93
Copyright case law is full of examples of copying that is
communicative under the First Amendment but viewed as
nontransformative under the Copyright Act. In Princeton University
Press, the copyshop case described above, it is clear that in selecting and
copying materials for students to read, the professors intended to and did
convey the message that the assigned materials were worth reading and
thinking about.'94 In addition, in Koons, the court held that the artist's
small, subtle changes to the plaintiff's puppies photograph were not
transformative, yet the context and the artist's subversive style clearly
conveyed a critical message to viewers.'
Finally, the transformativeness inquiry is too vague and malleable to
provide a meaningful standard for protecting free speech. How much
material must the copier add before he or she will be deemed to be
speaking? If the copier does not add new meaning or message but uses a
copyrighted work for a different purpose or in a way that increases
access, is that enough? Should courts consider transformativeness from
the copier's or viewer's perspective?'96 Under a definitional approach to
191. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569. 583 (1994) (referring to the allegedly
infringing song as a "joinder of reference and ridicule," the hallmark of parody).
192. See generally Tushnet, supra note i, at 564 ("Imagine that the government.., banned
speakers from copying directly from the public domain. This would be an enormous, intolerable
burden on speech, no less so because someone else said the words first, a long time ago.").
193. This use would be a prima facie violation of the public performance right under 17 U.S.C.
§ 1o6(4), but probably would be exempt from infringement under § 110(4), which creates an exception
for the nonprofit "performance of a nondramatic literary or musical work."
194. See 99 F.3d '381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
195. See 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992)-
196. See Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31
COLUM. J.L. &t ARrs 445, 466 (2008) ("If we are to retain transformativeness as a relevant answer, then,
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speech protection that protects only transformative uses of copyrighted
material, these troublesome questions would become constitutional
issues. Other attempts to provide a definitional rule are similarly
problematic. For instance, Nimmer suggested very limited First
Amendment protection for certain categories of copying necessary to the
public interest, such as the copying of news photographs.'" Yet even he
conceded the difficulty in distinguishing between news and
entertainment.'98 Moreover, in other First Amendment cases, courts tend
to reject such categorical treatment of speech.' As one court has said,
"[s]peech that entertains, like speech that informs, is protected by the
First Amendment because '[t]he line between the informing and the
entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right."' 2 0
B. COPYRIGHT'S SPEECH-ENHANCING PURPOSE DOES NOT RENDER
COPYING UNPROTECTED SPEECH
A second possible reason for courts' refusal to apply First
Amendment scrutiny to copyright law is that copying is not protected
speech because it is harmful to the speech interest underlying the
Copyright Act. As the Eldred Court noted, the constitutional Framers
"intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression," which is
why they granted Congress the power to enact copyright legislation.20 ' As
such, the Court concluded that copyright's own "traditional contours"-
including statutory doctrines such as the idea/expression dichotomy and
the fair use doctrine-ordinarily would be sufficient to protect speech
interests in copyright infringement claims. 2
Thus, while copyright law has much in common with other speech-
regulating laws, it is somewhat unique in that the governmental interest
let us at least ask the right question-not 'Who is speaking?' but 'Who is listening?'").
197. See Nimmer, supra note I, at 1199 (arguing that the copyright interest outweighs the free
speech interest in all "other graphic works, such as paintings, sculpture, etc.").
198. See id. ("There is a definitional problem as to when a photograph is a news photograph. This,
too, is a concept capable of great elasticity.").
199. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,510 (1948).
200. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F-3d 959, 969 (ioth Cir. 1996)
(quoting Winters, 333 U.S. at 510).
201. 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
558 (1985)). Of course, the fact that Article I empowers Congress to enact copyright law does not, in
and of itself, immunize the law from First Amendment scrutiny. See Rubenfeld, supra note i, at 12-13
("Just because a law passed by Congress falls within the terms of an Article I power, the law is not
thereby exempt from the Bill of Rights.. . . Rights trump powers, not vice versa."); William W. Van
Alstyne, Reconciling What the First Amendment Forbids with What the Copyright Clause Permits: A
Summary Explanation and Review, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 225, 236-37 (2003) (arguing that the
Article I power to enact copyright law does not insulate that law from First Amendment scrutiny but
merely "answers the 'federalism question'" by '"put[ting] to rest any question respecting the
controlling authority of its act vis-2-vis that of some inconsistent, or incongruent state or local law").
202. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-21 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556 558, 56o).
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in enforcing copyright law is itself related to furthering speech. That
interest includes encouraging the production and dissemination of speech
by granting exclusive rights over copyrighted expression. Paradoxically,
then, copyright law burdens speech in order to encourage it.
Of course, there is truth in the idea that copyright law can help to
advance the goals of free speech. Copyright law is arguably consistent
with the First Amendment to the extent that copyright law encourages
free expression by granting exclusive rights over expressive works. But as
we have seen, copying-even a good deal of copying that violates a
copyright holder's rights -also has speech value. Insofar as copyright law
prohibits copying that does not diminish a copyright holder's incentives
to create or distribute expressive works, it prohibits or chills some speech
without providing offsetting gains to speech elsewhere7" Such cases
present false conflicts between copyright law and the First Amendment,
where there is a speech interest in allowing the copying but no copyright
(or speech) interest in prohibiting it.
The key here is that copyright's speech-enhancing purpose does not
obviate or preclude First Amendment scrutiny; it merely identifies the
governmental interest to be assessed in applying that scrutiny to the
Copyright Act. Thus, it is not true that First Amendment scrutiny of
copyright law is impossible because "First Amendment values are on
both sides."204 Rather, First Amendment scrutiny mediates between the
speech interests "on both sides" by requiring courts to determine in each
case whether the defendant's particular use is likely to cause harm to the
incentives to create or distribute copyrighted works.
C. COPYRIGHT'S STATUS AS PROPERTY DOES NOT PRECLUDE FIRST
AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
The third potential reason for refusing to apply First Amendment
scrutiny to copyright law relates to the property-like nature of
copyrights. Copyrights are property, the argument goes, and the First
Amendment does not require property holders to let others use their
property for speech purposes. For instance, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, the
203. See generally Steven J. Horowitz, A Free Speech Theory of Copyright, 2009 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 2, 49, http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/horowitz-free-speech-theory.pdf ("If the Copyright Clause
embodies First Amendment values in its limits such that an independent free speech analysis is
typically unnecessary, then the clause's limits ought to be interpreted as ... free speech
limits ... [having] the force of the First Amendment."). Professor Rubenfeld argues that copyright
infringement cases are not exempt from First Amendment scrutiny even if infringement has a
"silencing effect" that reduces total speech. See Rubenfeld, supra note i, at 22-24. Of course, he is
correct that copyright infringement cases should not be categorically immune from First Amendment
scrutiny on this basis. On the other hand, in individual cases, if there is a valid governmental interest in
preventing harmful copying that "silences" copyrighted expression, then the copying may be
suppressed.
204. See McGowan, supra note lo6, at 295-96.
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Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not require an
owner of real property (in that case, a shopping center) to grant access to
persons exercising their constitutional rights of free speech when
adequate alternative avenues of communication exist." Real property is
unusual in that claims for trespass to real property do not require a
showing of harm, even when the alleged trespasser wishes to use the
property for speech purposes. Given real property's unique status in
American history and culture, the law presumes harm from trespass onto
real property.2o6 As such, the First Amendment does not compel property
holders to make it available for speech.
As Lemley and Volokh have argued, however, Congress cannot get
around First Amendment speech restrictions simply by designating as
"property" the thing or interest that is harmed by speech.2 ' For instance,
defamation claims are still subject to the First Amendment, even though
a person's right in his reputation might be deemed a property right.
Moreover, the nature of the property right in copyrights is
fundamentally different than the nature of tangible property rights in
ways that matter a great deal for First Amendment purposes. Copyrights
are granted in order to encourage the creation and dissemination of ideas
and expression, while real property rights-such as the shopping mall
property rights at issue in Lloyd-are granted for other reasons
unrelated to the First Amendment.os Also, the boundaries of real
property are delineated without regard to speech concerns. By contrast,
the Eldred Court held that the boundaries of copyright, especially the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine, strike a balance
between ownership of copyrights and freedom of speech.29 Indeed, the
Court's recognition of the need to protect speech by confining copyrights
within their "traditional contours" shows that a property label does not
automatically triumph over speech.2 IO
In addition, unlike real or personal tangible property, copyrights are
nonrivalrous property rights, meaning that many people can enjoy them
205. 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972).
206. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P-3d 296, 309 (Cal. 2003) (stating, in dicta, that inviolability
of real property makes trespass to real property actionable without showing of harm); Gross v. Capital
Elec. Line Builders, Inc., 861 P.2d 1326, 1329-31 (Kan. 1993) (reversing lower court's holding that
plaintiff must show damages under the "modem rule" of real property trespass).
207. See Lemley & Volokh, Injunctions, supra note i, at 183.
208. See Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note i, at 39 ("[R]eal property rights are general
regulations that impose only isolated and incidental burdens on speech. Where property rights are not
in land, but in information, expression, or communicative capacity, they are more properly
characterized as speech regulations."); Rubenfeld, supra note i, at 24-25 (stating that copyright law is
different from ordinary property laws because "copyright creates property rights in speech, rather than
merely in things,' and those rights create liability for speaking).
209. See 537 U.S. i86, 218-20 (2003).
210. See Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under the Regulatory
State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1541, i580 (2008) (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221).
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at the same time.?" Thus, an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work
does not necessarily oust the owner (or her licensees) from using the
work. Whereas a real property trespass presumptively harms the owner
through dispossession-because two people cannot occupy a specific spot
on land at the same time-copyright infringement ordinarily does not
cause harm by dispossessing the copyright holder of her property."'
Yet, Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner have
identified another potential form of harm arising from unauthorized uses
of copyrighted works. They note that overuse of copyrighted works
might exhaust their value by causing market saturation and ultimately
loss of consumer demand." This concern over "congestion externalities"
is based on the tragedy of the commons: just as a pasture can be over-
grazed unless it is enclosed and propertized, copyrighted works can be
over-utilized unless the copyright holder's property right enables him to
exclude others from use.214
Although this argument has some intuitive appeal, it ultimately falls
far short of supporting a presumption of harm in copyright law,
especially as against a First Amendment challenge. First, Landes and
Posner themselves do not argue that congestion externalities warrant
property-like protection for creative works. While they emphasize "the
contribution that the enclosure movement made to agricultural
productivity," they are doubtful that "rampant propertization of
information and other intellectual goods would have similarly beneficent
effects."2"5 They elaborate that "[i]t is easy to imagine agriculture without
common pastures but difficult to imagine a system under which, for
example, every possible combination of words, symbols, colors and other
mark of identification were owned.",,, 6 They also acknowledge numerous
examples of public domain works that have maintained their value
despite widespread and uncontrolled use, including the works of
Shakespeare and characters such as Pinocchio and Cinderella.2 1 ' Thus,
211. See Lemley & Volokh, Injunctions, supra note i, at 184-85 (stating that intellectual property's
nonrivalrous nature makes it different from other forms of property for purposes of First
Amendment).
212. See Bohannan, supra note 76, at 970-71 (arguing that harm may not be presumed from use of
nonrivalrous copyrighted works).
213. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 222-28 (2003), id at 226 ("The result of [widespread unauthorized variants of a
copyrighted work] could be premature saturation of the market, consumer confusion,. . . and impaired
demand for the original work because of the poor quality of some of the unauthorized derivative
works.").
214. See id. at 12-14.
215. Id. at 13.
216. Id.
2I7. Id. at 226-27.
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they conclude that they "must not press the congestion argument. . . too
far. "8
Second, it is unlikely that congestion externalities, without any
showing of actual market substitution, would present sufficient harm to
satisfy First Amendment scrutiny. Except for the occasional case
involving a protest at a shopping mall or the like, uses of real property
ordinarily do not implicate the First Amendment, whereas many, if not
most, uses of copyrighted material do. As we have seen, the First
Amendment typically requires real and immediate harm, not merely
speculative or potential future harm. It is not sufficient for the copyright
holder to show that she was deprived of some profits that she otherwise
might have enjoyed. Rather, the harm must be of such a nature and to
such an extent that it would be expected to reduce the copyright holder's
ex ante incentives to create or distribute her copyrighted works. It would
be inappropriate to presume that a particular unauthorized use is likely
to "crowd out" other uses and substantially reduce the long-term value
of authorized works, especially given that some unauthorized uses of
copyrighted works actually increase demand for a copyrighted work or its
authorized derivatives.
Furthermore, it should be fairly obvious that copyrights are much
more akin to personal property than to real property."' Unlike claims for
trespass to real property, claims for trespass to personal property (or
chattels) require a showing of harm. As the California Supreme Court
has noted, the Restatement (Second) of Torts emphasizes "that some
actual injury must have occurred in order for a trespass to chattels to be
actionable."2 20 The Restatement explains:
The interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability, unlike the
similar interest of a possessor of land, is not given legal protection by
an action for nominal damages for harmless intermeddlings with the
chattel.... Therefore, one who intentionally intermeddles with
another's chattel is subject to liability only if his intermeddling is
harmful to the possessor's materially valuable interest in the physical
condition, quality, or value of the chattel . . . .221
218. See id. at 226.
219. See Bohannan, supra note 76, at 983-84 (observing that copyrights, unlike real property, are
nonrivalrous goods, and that the Copyright Act treats copyrights as intangible personal property by
providing in § 20(d) that "copyright ownership 'may ... pass as personal property by the applicable
laws of intestate succession"' (alteration in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2ooo))).
220. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P-3d 296, 302 (Cal. 2003); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218
(1965); see also DOBBS, supra note 42, at 124 ("To establish liability for trespass to chattels, the
possessor must show legally recognizable harm.").
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e. There is, however, a disconnect between the
property right and remedy in the Restaternent's trespass rule. Although the owner of a chattel may not
sue for trespass absent a showing of harm, the Restatement does allow the use of self-help measures to
prevent harmless intermeddlings. See i. ("Sufficient legal protection of the possessor's interest in the
mere inviolability of his chattel is afforded by his privilege to use reasonable force to protect his
I1I25
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Courts have overwhelmingly followed this rule, refusing to extend
the real property analogy beyond its obvious bounds."' For instance, in
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, the California Supreme Court held that the
defendant's unauthorized e-mail communications to Intel employees
were not governed by the law relating to real property trespass. 2 3 Rather,
the court applied personal property trespass rules, requiring a showing of
real harm.224 Indeed, the court said that Intel would have to show that the
property was actually damaged, not just that Intel suffered consequential
damage due to the communication." Numerous other cases likewise
have held that claims for trespass to personal property require real proof
of harm to the property itself.226
possession against even harmless interference."). Numerous scholars have discussed the relationship
between property ownership and self-help. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right
To Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 593,
613-14 (2oo8); Richard A. Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi The Role of Self-help in Cyberspace?, i J.L. EcoN.
& POL'Y 147 (2005); David McGowan, The Trespass Trouble and the Metaphor Muddle, i J.L. EcoN. &
POL'Y 109 (2005); Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, i J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 69
(2005). The extent to which self-help measures would be available and effective to prevent copyright
infringement is unclear. To be sure, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides legal
reinforcement for technological self-help measures. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2oo6) (prohibiting the
circumvention of technological measures, such as encryption, that protect access to copyrightable
material, and further prohibiting the trafficking of such technology). On the other hand, injunctive
relief to prevent harmless uses of copyrighted material would be particularly problematic under the
First Amendment. See generally Lemley & Volokh, Injunctions, supra note I (arguing that copyright
law is speech restriction under the First Amendment and that injunctions of speech are usually
unconstitutional).
222. See, e.g., Hamidi, 71 P-3d at 308-1o; Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 472-73,
475 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding, inter alia, that a long-distance phone company was required to prove
actual damages in its suit against the parents of a child who hacked and made unauthorized use of the
company's computer system).
223. 71 P-3d at 309-II (rejecting Richard Epstein's position that Intel's server is "its castle").
224. See id at 3o8-II (indicating that in order to prevail on a trespass to chattels claim, Intel would
have to show actual harm to property, such as impairment to functioning of e-mail or computer
system).
225. See id. at 308 (noting that employee time spent reading and discussing defendant's e-mails did
not constitute harm to Intel's property interest).
226. See, e.g., SecureInfo Corp. v. Telos Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 593, 621 (E.D. Va. 2005) (no
trespass to chattel when defendant surreptitiously obtained a copy of plaintiffs commercial software
and the database contained in it in order to compare it with its own database because, although
plaintiff alleged harm to its business as a result, unlawful trespass required a showing of harm to the
software itself); In re Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 3 18-19 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (holding that JetBlue's collection of passenger data was not a trespass to chattels because there
was no proof of harm); Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475 (rejecting the plaintiff's attempt to satisfy its
burden of proving actual damages "merely by producing a formula or figure that in the abstract
purport[ed] to represent the average damages suffered as a consequence of similar torts"); Terrell v.
Rowsey, 647 N.E.2d 662 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (finding no trespass to chattel when supervisor who
suspected employee of drinking opened employee's car and found empty beer bottle, because
defendant "did not dispossess [plaintiff] of his automobile and it sustained no impairment as to its
condition, quality or value"); Dryden v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 734 N.E.2d 409, 416 (Ohio Ct. App.
1999) (finding that coworkers who opened plaintiff's fanny pack because of suspicion that he was
carrying a gun did not commit a trespass because there was no injury to either the pack or the
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Thus, to the extent that copyright infringement may be viewed as a
kind of trespass to property, it is most like trespass to personal property,
for which harm ordinarily must be proved. As such, the copyrights-as-
property characterization does not defeat or obviate the requirement to
show harm in copyright infringement cases but actually supports it.
Finally, the Lloyd case merely stands for the proposition that the
First Amendment does not, in and of itself, require a property owner to
allow others to use his property for speech purposes. As will be discussed
in more detail in Part VI.C, infra, the Court also has held that the First
Amendment does not prohibit another law from requiring a property
owner to allow such use so long as the property is not within the
exclusive personal control of the property owner (i.e., so long as the
property is accessible to the public), and the law neither violates the
Takings nor the Due Process Clauses. As such, although copyrights are
in some sense "property," there is nothing troublesome about limiting
these property rights in order to make way for harmless speech.
IV. HOW A HARM-BASED APPROACH CAN PROTECT FREE SPEECH IN
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CASES
As the foregoing Parts show, whether copyright law is content-based
or content-neutral, it is a speech restriction. The best way for courts to
address speech issues in copyright law would be to apply First
Amendment scrutiny to infringement cases in the same way that they
apply it to other kinds of cases. Applying direct First Amendment
scrutiny would not require relying on the vagaries of fair use or other
statutory litigation to protect important First Amendment values.227
Under the First Amendment, copyright law must be supported by a
legitimate governmental interest. Generally speaking, copyright law can
proffer such an interest: consistent with the Patent and Copyright Clause
of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has noted many times that the
governmental interest behind copyright law is to encourage the creation
plaintiff); see also Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1Q20, 1025 (N.D. Cal.
1998) (finding plaintiff likely to prevail on trespass to chattels claim upon showing that defendant's
unsolicited e-mails filled up plaintiffs computer storage space); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022-23 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that sending unsolicited
commercial bulk e-mail stated claim for trespass to chattels where it was shown that processing power
and disk space were adversely affected); Sch. of Visual Arts v. Kuprewicz, 771 N.Y.S.2d 804, 8o8 (Sup.
Ct. 2003) (holding that disgruntled former employee's posting of numerous unsolicited job
applications and pornographic e-mails to employer's computers gave rise to a claim of trespass to
chattels where the plaintiff alleged that its hard drive space was depleted, processing power drained,
and other computer resources adversely affected).
227. See Horowitz, supra note 203, 72-86 (highlighting several problems with the Court's view




and dissemination of expressive works.28 But while this general interest
is probably sufficient to save most provisions of the Copyright Act from
facial constitutional challenges, it is not always sufficient to justify
particular findings of infringement against as-applied challenges.2 ' As we
have seen, the First Amendment does not allow courts to assume that a
general governmental interest in suppressing speech is at work in every
case. Rather, courts must scrutinize every application of a speech
restriction to see whether the defendant's speech is likely to harm the
government's interest in that particular case. Thus, in copyright
infringement cases, courts should determine whether the defendant's use
of copyrighted material is likely to cause harm sufficient to reduce a
copyright holder's incentives to create or disseminate copyrighted works.
Courts should assess the harm caused to the copyright holder's incentives
on a case-by-case basis and then balance any such harm against the
speech value of the defendant's use. As such, a harm requirement would
ensure that findings of infringement and damages are limited to
situations in which, as Professor Yochai Benkler put it, "government has
the kind of good reasons that would justify any other regulation of
information production and exchange." 230
The Seinfeld trivia book case provides a useful illustration of how
courts should assess harm in First Amendment scrutiny of copyright
infringement cases.23' There, the defendant produced a Seinfeld trivia
book, which occupies a market that is quite remote from the market for
the television show. Moreover, the plaintiff producers testified that they
had no intention of entering the market for trivia books.232 Thus, the
defendant's trivia book did not harm the plaintiff's economic incentives
to create or distribute the copyrighted work or obvious derivative works.
Unless the defendant's trivia book caused some other type of harm (as
will be discussed infra Part VI), there was no copyright interest in
228. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.io (1994) ("[T]he goals of
the copyright law [are] "to stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter-....' (quoting
Leval, supra note 176, at 1134)); Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 55 8 (1985)
("[C]opyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."); Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but
private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts.").
229. See Bender, supra note 175, at 332 ("[T]he issue of whether copyright and the First
Amendment conflict is not one that ought to be resolved wholesale. It's one that ought to be resolved
retail. The First Amendment has in it. . . the idea that things can be constitutional on their face and in
general, but unconstitutional as applied.").
230. Benkler, supra note i, at 357. Thus, copyright infringement cases in which no harm is evident
would be "'easy cases"~ of technical violations of exclusive rights that nevertheless fall within a
functional definition of the public domain. See id. at 365-62.
23!I. See Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc.. 150 F.3d 532 (2d Cir. 1998).
232. Id. at 144-45.
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prohibiting the defendants' use of the copyrighted material. As a result,
the speech value in allowing the use should have prevailed.
Of course, there might be some cases in which copying cannot be
characterized as speech or expression, or the copying otherwise has little
speech value. These cases are likely to be few in number, because, as we
have seen, even pure copying can have speech value to the copyist or
listeners. In addition, seemingly inconsequential speech (or, as in
Seinfeld, speech about nothing) often has value because it informs
political and social views. Nevertheless, if a court decides that the
challenged copying was not intended or understood to communicate a
message, then it may decide that the copying was not speech at all and
therefore that First Amendment scrutiny is unwarranted. Alternatively,
courts may wish to focus on the harm associated with the defendant's
alleged infringement. Where the speech value of the defendant's copying
is dubious, harm to the copyright holder might be clear. Except in some
cases of personal copying, pure non-expressive copying can cause harm
by supplanting the market for the original. Indeed, in at least some cases,
the harm will be so apparent that it can be presumed. In such cases, it is
unlikely that the harm will be outweighed by the speech value of the
copying.
On the other hand, if courts continue to rely on copyright's own
"traditional contours," they will take a less direct approach to protecting
speech interests.233 Even here, however, harm will play a central role.
Traditionally, copyright infringement claims originated as tort claims
requiring proof of harm. Under the early English copyright statutes on
which the American copyright statutes are based, authors sued for
copyright infringement by bringing an action for "trespass on the case."234
Unlike actions for trespass, which typically have allowed recovery
without a showing of harm, actions for trespass on the case have always
required a showing of actual harm in the form of physical injury or
monetary loss.2
In addition, early statutory rights themselves were much more
limited than they are today.236 In the late 17oos and early i8oos, the
statutory copyright monopoly protected only a book as it was published
233. See Kasunic, supra note 8o, at 412-13 (describing the use of copyright's traditional contours as
an alternative to "[a]pplying heightened scrutiny to the statute itself").
234. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 453-54 (4th ed. 2002)
(discussing the English Copyright Act of 1709).
235. See DOBBS, supra note 42, at 25-26; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 76 (1999).
236. John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 465, 466 (2oo5) ("[T]he Copyright Clause of the Constitution, the 1790 Copyright Act, and the
early jurisprudence of the Republic envisioned copyright as a property right limited in both scope and
duration, with the particular goal of encouraging the dissemination of knowledge."); see also
Bohannan, supra note 76, at 975 (describing evolution of early copyright law).
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and not other works that might be based on the published book.231
Accordingly, courts held that translations, abridgements, and other
transformative uses were noninfringing.238 At that time, the rule seemed
to be that "if the accused book was a work of authorship, it could not at
the same time infringe." 239
In 1841, Justice Story decided Folsom v. Marsh, which essentially
created the fair use doctrine. 240 Although some scholars have argued that
Folsom actually expanded the scope of copyright protection by holding
that some abridgements and other transformative uses may infringe
copyrights under some circumstances,2 41 the decision also emphasized
that harm to the copyright holder is the cornerstone of infringement.
Specifically, it provided that liability turns on "the degree in which the
use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the
objects, of the original work." 243
The 1976 Copyright Act altered copyright's traditional contours,
bringing changes that prevent or discourage harmless uses of copyrighted
material in speech.2 " First, it added a broad derivative-works right, which
gives copyright holders exclusive rights not only over the original work
but also over any work in which the original work might be "recast,
237. Tehranian, supra note 236, at 466 ("[W]hile early copyright laws prohibited slavish copying of
a protected work, no interdiction precluded transformative uses of a protected work because such uses
were considered accretive to progress in the arts.").
238. See id. at 474-80 (discussing illustrative cases).
239. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT IO(1966).
240. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
241. See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431, 432
(1998). Patterson explains as follows:
Prior to Folsom, copyright could best be understood as a subset of public domain law in the
form of a limited statutory monopoly; Folsom laid the groundwork for transforming
copyright into a subset of property law as a natural law right.... The former concept
provides greater, the latter less, leeway for use by others, and this issue has assumed a new
importance in light of communications technology by reason of which copyright holders
may be able to control all access to copyrighted material ....
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Tehranian, supra note 236, at 481 ("Far from creating fair use and
carving a hole into the copyright monopoly, Justice Story's decision in Folsom transformed copyright
law and expanded its monopoly.").
242. See 9 F. Cas. at 348-49 (stating several times that liability turns on the extent to which the
original author will be injured by the copying); see also Patterson, supra note 241, at 439-4o (stating
that Folsom's "test is harm to the original work"); id. at 447 ("[T]he Folsom test was centered on the
market impact of the competitive use. The modern view, promoted by copyright owners, is that the
fair use doctrine limits the right of individuals to use a copyrighted work for their personal purposes
regardless of market impact.").
243. See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 349.
244. See Lemley, supra note 78 (arguing that recent developments in copyright law "unmoor fair
use from the traditional rationale of market loss"); Bohannan, supra note 72, at 58i (tracing evolution
of copyright law and arguing that due to special-interest influence, the size of the Copyright Act and
the amount of protection it affords has grown exceedingly in the last thirty years).
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transformed, or adapted." 4 5 As Judge Alex Kozinski has observed, the
derivative-works right is "hopelessly overbroad" because all new works
must build on existing works to some degree.246 Such broad rights enable
copyright holders to demand licensing fees for just about any copying of
their works.247 In doing so, they also prohibit a good deal of harmless
speech. While copyright holders can foresee some copying and derivative
uses of their copyrighted works, they are not likely to rely on the ability
to control all peripheral uses of their copyrighted works in deciding
whether to create or distribute those works. 8 When copying does not
harm a reasonable copyright holder's incentives to create or distribute
copyrighted works, finding infringement cannot be justified by the
governmental interest in encouraging the creation and distribution of
copyrighted works.
Second, the 1976 Act altered copyright's traditional contours
(perhaps unintentionally) by reducing the scope of fair use. The Act
purported to codify the common-law fair use doctrine without change.2 49
Yet, the version of fair use that we have today is quite different from
Justice Story's. Today, although harm is one of the four factors
considered in fair use, it is not always treated as the touchstone.
Moreover, courts currently treat fair use as an affirmative defense,
putting the burden of proof on the defendant to prove the absence of
harm.2 0 Yet, because Folsom did not create a fair use defense as such, but
rather redefined the test of infringement,"' Folsom arguably would have
required the copyright holder to bear the burden of proof on the issue of
harm as part of the burden to prove infringement."' The language of the
245. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2oo6) (defining "derivative work"); id. § lo6(2) (granting derivative-
works right).
246. See Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, iilo-ii (9th Cir. 1998) (adding judicial
limitations on the derivative-works right in light of excessively broad statutory definition).
247. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 78, at 190-91 (observing that demands for license fees have
"skyrocketed").
248. Bohannan, supra note 76, at 988-89 (arguing that just as the reasonable person in tort law will
act with regard to ordinary foreseeable circumstances, reasonable copyright holders will rely only on
foreseeable markets for their copyrighted works in deciding whether to create or disseminate
copyrighted works). See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives,
122 HARv. L. REV. 1569 (2009) (using bounded rationality to argue that foreseeable copying should be
part of the test for infringement).
249. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 568o ("Section
107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it
in any way.").
250. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (describing fair use as an
affirmative defense).
251. See Patterson, supra note 241, at 431-32 (arguing that one myth of Folsom is that "Folsom
created fair use, when in fact it merely redefined infringement"); Tehranian, supra note 223, at 481.
252. But see Tehranian, supra note 236, at 483 ("Previously ..,. the burden of persuasion lay with
the copyright holder to demonstrate that the work was infringing and not transformative. Under
Folsom and its progeny, once the copyright holder made a prima facie showing that the alleged
infringer borrowed the protected work, the burden then shifted to the alleged infringer to demonstrate
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fair use provision in the 1976 Act seems to support this allocation of the
burden of proof. It does not designate fair use as a defense but rather
states that "notwithstanding [the exclusive rights listed in] sections io6
and io6A, the fair use of a copyrighted work... is not an infringement of
copyright."253 Unfortunately, the structure of the Act creates some
ambiguity on the issue, as fair use is located in a separate provision
following the provision enumerating copyright holders' exclusive rights.
Thus, courts now hold that defendants bear the burden of proof on fair
use and harm.
Both the derivative-works right and the fair use doctrine must be
reshaped in order to reinstate the traditional focus on harm. As will be
discussed further in Parts VI and VII, infra, the plaintiff should
ordinarily bear the burden to show that the allegedly infringing use is of
a type likely to cause harm to her incentives to create or distribute,
except where the defendant has engaged in close copying of the work in
the plaintiff's most foreseeable markets, in which case such harm may be
presumed. In addition, the derivative-works right must be limited to
those types of uses that copyright holders would be likely to rely on in
deciding whether to create or distribute copyrighted works. Indeed, the
right should arguably be limited to the list of illustrations in the statutory
definition of "derivative works," as those illustrations would encompass
most of the uses a reasonable copyright holder would expect to exploit.
Even under a broader reading of the derivative-works right, however, the
mere assertion that a defendant's violation of the right of reproduction
or the right to prepare derivative works requires payment of a license fee
will not necessarily demonstrate the requisite harm. The question is
whether the harm is likely to be significant enough to reduce a copyright
holder's incentives to create or distribute the work.
Moreover, courts should recognize that statutory doctrines, even
when properly applied, cannot always provide the level of protection that
the First Amendment requires. Nimmer argued that "a grave danger to
copyright may lie in the failure to distinguish between the statutory
privilege known as fair use and an emerging constitutional limitation on
copyright contained in the first amendment."254 For instance, he noted
that "[t]he first amendment privilege, when appropriate, may be invoked
despite the fact that the marketability of the copied work is thereby
impaired.""' Accordingly, it is important to clarify that, even if copyright
law implements the proposed harm requirement, direct First
Amendment scrutiny will still be necessary in some circumstances. First
Amendment scrutiny should be applied where the speech value of the
that his use was excusable.").
253. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (emphasis added).
254. Nimmer, supra note i, at 1200.
255. Id. at 1201.
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copying clearly outweighs the harm or where copyright law burdens
speech in structural ways that cannot be addressed in individual
infringement cases.
In ordinary cases of copyright infringement, however, a harm
requirement can provide a way for courts to vindicate both copyright and
First Amendment values. Here, Nimmer's concern seems less valid. For
instance, based on the differences between the statutory privilege of fair
use and the constitutional protection of the First Amendment, Nimmer
disapproved of cases such as Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates.26 In
that case, the district court held that it was fair use for the defendant to
use in its book still frames from the copyrighted Zapruder film of the
Kennedy assassination." The court found fair use because "the effect of
the use of certain frames in the Book on [plaintiffs proposed projects
was] speculative.""' Indeed, the court concluded that "[i]t seems more
reasonable to speculate that the Book would, if anything, enhance the
value of the copyrighted work."259 Nimmer argued that the court's
analysis improperly conflated First Amendment and fair use issues.2 He
said that the court ignored the defendant's impairment of the
marketability of the copyrighted work26 ' because of First Amendment
concerns regarding the "public interest in having the fullest information
available on the murder of President Kennedy." 2
Yet, in this Author's view, the court used copyright's "built-in First
Amendment accommodations""' effectively. In light of First
Amendment concerns, the court used fair use analysis to determine
whether the defendant's use caused any real harm to the copyright
owner's incentives to create or distribute the copyrighted work. Absent
harm, there would be no copyright interest in suppressing the speech,
and therefore no basis for finding infringement. The judge found that any
such harm was speculative because the plaintiff had no immediate plans
to use the work in a manner similar to defendant's and because the
defendant's use could actually enhance sales of the original work.264 By
requiring real proof of harm in the same way that courts generally
256. Id. at 1200.
257. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Nimmer, supra note i, at 1201.
261. See id. ("Judge Wyatt, in the Bernard Geis (Zapruder film) case, purported to rely upon fair
use rather than upon the first amendment. He therefore found it necessary to take the position that
the defendant's activities in publishing a book, containing copied frames of the Zapruder film, did not
work any injury to the plaintiff's market for the same film.").
262. Id. at 1200 (quoting Bernard Geis, 293 F. Supp. at 146).
263. Bldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. r86, 190 (2003).
264. Bernard Geis, 293 F. Supp. at 146.
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require harm in First Amendment cases, the court was able to effectuate
both copyright and First Amendment values.
Thus far, this Article has argued that a harm requirement, properly
applied, would serve copyright's constitutional purpose of encouraging
creativity by allowing people to use and build upon copyrighted works
where doing so does not affect the copyright holder's incentives to create
or distribute a copyrighted work. The next Part of the Article identifies
the different types of harm that may arise in copyright infringement cases
and considers which of those harms are cognizable under the First
Amendment.
V. DEFINING COPYRIGHT HARM ACCORDING TO
FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES
In order to use a harm requirement to protect speech in copyright
cases, it is necessary to consider the kinds of harms that might arise in
copyright infringement cases. Most obviously, because the Supreme
Court has consistently held that the purpose of copyright law is to
provide an economic incentive to create and disseminate copyrighted
works, copying that supplants the copyright holder's expected markets
will likely cause market harm to the copyright holder. Yet nonmarket
harms might arise in copyright infringement cases as well. Authors'
natural and moral rights in their works of authorship might play at least
an implicit role in how courts view the harm caused by copying. As part
of these rights, or in addition to them, it is possible that types of harm
recognized in other areas of law, such as harm to reputation or violations
of privacy, might be recognized in copyright law. In addition, copyright
holders might attempt to assert harm to their own First Amendment
rights, particularly their rights not to speak or associate, when someone
else uses their copyrighted works without their permission.
In the following sections, I will address in depth how the First
Amendment should inform the definition of harm in copyright
infringement cases. I conclude that while copyright harm clearly includes
the harm of market substitution, it must not include harm due to criticism
or disparagement. This definition of harm precludes a finding of
infringement based on what I will call "copyright dilution,,26, in which a
defendant's use might cause some harm to the image or reputation of a
copyrighted work but causes no harm from market substitution.
Furthermore, courts should not recognize harm to the plaintiff's right not
to speak or right to privacy, except in cases involving the copying of
unpublished works.
265. See Bohannan, supra note 76, at 1022-27 (identifying and defining the concept of "copyright
dilution" as an inappropriate theory of copyright infringement based on a type of harm reminiscent of
the harm associated with trademark dilution).
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A. MARKET HARM AND COPYRIGHT AS THE "ENGINE OF FREE ExPRESSION"
The least controversial form of harm that courts might recognize
from copyright infringement is the economic harm of market
substitution. The following cases suggest how courts can use a market
harm requirement to protect speech under either direct First
Amendment scrutiny or copyright's own statutory doctrines.
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the owners
of copyrights in television programs sued Sony, arguing that Sony's
Betamax home video recorder machines contributed to copyright
infringement by home viewers who used the machines to copy the
programs.266 In considering whether Sony was liable for contributory
copyright infringement, the Court first had to determine whether the
viewers' main use of the machine ("time-shifting" television programs to
watch them at a different time) was fair use.7 Summarizing the district
court's findings on this issue, the Supreme Court described how the
lower court had used fair use to protect the First Amendment value in
broad dissemination:
The District Court concluded that noncommercial home use
recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was a fair use
of copyrighted works and did not constitute copyright
infringement.... Moreover, the court found that the purpose of this
use served the public interest in increasing access to television
programming, an interest that "is consistent with the First Amendment
policy of providing the fullest possible access to information through
the public airwaves." Even when an entire copyrighted work was
recorded, the District Court regarded the copying as fair use "because
there is no accompanying reduction in the market for 'plaintiff's
original work.'"26 8
In deciding that the home viewers' verbatim copying of television
programs was fair use, the Court rejected the view that fair use should be
limited to transformative or socially productive uses. The Court said that
"the notion of social 'productivity' cannot be a complete answer to this
analysis" because there is value in many different kinds of copying.2fX)it
explained:
A teacher who copies to prepare lecture notes is clearly productive.
But so is a teacher who copies for the sake of broadening his personal
understanding of his specialty. Or a legislator who copies for the sake
of broadening her understanding of what her constituents are
266. 464 U.S. 417,420 (1984).
267. See id. at 443 (noting that contributory copyright infringement turns upon whether the
product is "capable of substantial noninfringing uses," and holding that private time-shifting satisfies
this standard because it constitutes fair use).
268. Id. at 425-26 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, 480 F. Supp. 429, 454 (C.D. Cal. x979)).
269. Id. at 455 n.4o.
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watching; or a constituent who copies a news program to help make a
decision on how to vote.2 0
Having acknowledged the personal and social value in copying, the
Court applied a harm-based approach to fair use that mediates between
the owners and users of copyrighted materials by limiting copyright
protection to that which is necessary to serve the purpose of copyright.27'
The Court stated:
The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative
effort... .[A] use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential
market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not be
prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to create....
... What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.272
Using harm as the touchstone of fair use analysis, the Court
reviewed the district court's decision to determine whether there was any
evidence that the home viewers' taping of television programs was likely
to harm copyright holders or their incentives to create copyrighted
works. The Court concluded that "the District Court restated its overall
conclusion several times, in several different ways. 'Harm from time-
shifting is speculative and, at best, minimal." 2 "
As such, the Sony case was essentially a false conflict between
copyright law and the First Amendment. There was, as the district court
had said, First Amendment value in allowing the "fullest possible access"
to information.274 But because there was no harm to the copyright
holders' incentives to create or distribute the work, there was no
copyright interest in enforcing the copyright.
The dissent disagreed with the majority's emphasis on proof of
harm, asserting that copyright holders should be "entitled to share in the
benefits of [the] new market" for time-shifted viewing of their
programs." This view essentially takes the position that copyright
holders are entitled to share in all benefits deriving from uses of their
works, regardless of whether the use would impair the copyright holders'
270. Id.
271. See Bohannan, supra note 76, at 991-96; id. at 996 ("Under [the Sony Court's] approach,
courts will find fair use where a defendant's use of copyrighted material ... causes no meaningful
harm to the copyright owner of a kind that is likely to affect incentives to create copyrighted works.").
But see Wendy I Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. I6oo (1982) (arguing that Sony proposes a
market failure approach to fair use); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony
Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REv. 975 (2002) (suggesting that Sony instead represents a balancing approach).
272. Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51 (emphasis added in part).
273. Id. at 454 (quoting 480 F. Supp. at 467).
274. Id. at 425.
275. See id. at 498 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Plaintiffs] . .. can show harm ..,. simply by showing
that the value of their copyrights would increase if they were compensated for the copies that are used
in the new market.").
1 136 [Vol. 61: io83
May 2010] COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND HARMLESS SPEECH
incentives to create and distribute copyrighted works. Yet, as Professors
Brett Frischmann and Mark Lemley have argued, "[s]pillovers-
uncompensated benefits that one person's activity provides to another-
are everywhere,"276 and "there is good economic evidence that greater
innovation spillovers are associated with more, not less, innovation."2 77
Moreover, as this Article has argued, requiring compensation for
harmless uses of copyrighted works unnecessarily threatens free speech.
By contrast, the Sony majority's approach serves First Amendment
values. The majority indicated that harm may be presumed only where
the facts make harm very likely; otherwise, the plaintiff has to prove
harm.7' This approach harmonizes copyright law and the First
Amendment by presuming harm only where it is foreseeable enough to
affect incentives to create or distribute the work.
Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises represents the other
side of the same coin.279 There, the defendant surreptitiously obtained
and published in its news magazine excerpts of President Ford's memoirs
just before portions of the memoirs were to be published in Time
Magazine."o Time cancelled its contract with Harper & Row and refused
to make its final payment of $12,500.'81 The defendant argued that its use
was fair because it used the copyrighted material for news reporting and
because there was First Amendment value in allowing access to material
of public importance."' The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's
argument, however, holding that such clear evidence of harm precluded a
finding of fair use.28 Having found this harm, the Court did not go on to
apply First Amendment scrutiny. Despite the defendant's argument that
"First Amendment values" necessitated broader fair use protection for
information "relate[d] to matters of high public concern,"284 the Court




Although the defendant's status as a news magazine made this a
difficult case, the Supreme Court arguably reached the correct decision.
The evidence of market substitution was clear. Although the amount of
lost profits might not have been sufficient to affect President Ford's
276. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 258 (2007)
(providing examples).
277. See id. at 284.
278. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
279. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
280. Id. at 542.
281. Id. at 543-44.
282. Id at 555-56.
283. See id. at 540-41.
284. Id. at 55-5 (quoting Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d ro44,
1050 (2d Cir. 1983))-
285. Id. at 556
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incentives to write the memoir, the market for prepublication excerpts is
a foreseeable market that the publisher likely would take into account in
deciding how to distribute portions of the work in various forms. Indeed,
the publisher was on the verge of publishing the work in a similar news
magazine. Equally important, the defendant's use was not likely to
enhance free speech any more than the plaintiff's use would have;
indeed, the reason the harm was so clear was that the defendant's use
simply supplanted the plaintiff's own intended use."'
The foregoing cases show how the presence or absence of market
harm can help to resolve the conflict between copyright law and the First
Amendment. The proposed approach applies to claims involving market
substitution as well as to claims involving a demand for license fees. The
remaining sections address whether the First Amendment permits
recognition of nonmarket harms in copyright infringement cases.
B. NONMARKET HARM: REPUTATIONAL HARM AND THE MARKETPLACE OF
IDEAS
The concept of harm in copyright law is not necessarily limited to
market harm. It is also necessary to consider whether protection against
nonmarket harms, such as disparagement of a copyrighted work's image,
would serve First Amendment values.
The paradigmatic copyright infringement case is probably one in
which the defendant has merely copied from a copyrighted work without
adding to or changing it. In other cases, however, the defendant has not
only copied from a copyrighted work but has also changed some aspect
of the work, such as its meaning, context, or purpose. These uses are
generally referred to as "transformative." Although there is no precise
definition of what constitutes a transformative use, this type of use is
generally favored in fair use analysis either because it provides social
value, or because the transformation renders it a poor substitute for the
original work and therefore the use causes no meaningful likelihood of
market harm.'8 9
286. See Bohannan, supra note 76, at 998. In other cases, however, once harm to the copyright
holder is shown, First Amendment values might require courts to balance that harm against the speech
value of the defendant's use. If the speech value of the defendant's use outweighs the harm to the
copyright holder, courts should either find the use noninfringing or award damages but deny injunctive
relief. The latter approach allows the defendant's speech while compensating the copyright holder for
her actual harm. See generally eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.. 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2oo6)
(holding that in copyright infringement cases, courts may grant injunctive relief, in their discretion,
based on "equitable considerations" that include the effect of the injunction on the public interest).
Yet, the proposed approach emphasizes that courts should balance only when there is real harm in the
first place. Otherwise, a "balancing" approach might seem to imply that the defendant's use must
always have some social value to justify the infringement. If social value is always required, harmless
personal uses of copyrighted material lose out, resulting in serious and unnecessary burdens on speech.
287. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., Slo U.S. 569, 579 (1994); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross
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Yet, transformative uses might cause other forms of harm, such as
harm to the image of the copyrighted work or to the copyright holder.
Sometimes the defendant's transformation is favorable to the image of
the copyrighted work, as when the defendant produces a popular movie
based on a copyrighted short story. Other times, however, the
transformation is less benign. The transformation might criticize the
work, cast it in a negative light, or create an unwholesome association
between the plaintiff's copyrighted work and the defendant's less
appealing one. In these cases, the copyright holder might feel that she or
her work has suffered some kind of reputation- or image-related harm,
even if the defendant's use did not cause any meaningful likelihood of
market harm. As I have argued elsewhere, this kind of harm might be
called "copyright dilution" because of its resemblance to the harm
associated with trademark dilution.288
The Second Circuit's decision in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson provides an
example of judicial recognition of harm to the image of a copyrighted
work.289 In that case, the defendant created a song entitled Cunnilingus
Champion of Company C, which copied the tune of Boogie Woogie
Bugle Boy of Company B, but substituted new lyrics related to the
"humorous practice of cunnilingus." 290 The court was not amused.
Rejecting the defendant's testimony that the purpose of the new song
was to "combin[e] the innocent music of the '40's with words often
considered to be taboo to make a very funny point," the court concluded
that the new song was neither parody nor satire and was not otherwise
transformative.29' Ultimately, the court held that the song was not fair
use, despite major differences between the two songs that made market
substitution unlikely.292
The Second Circuit's opinion revealed the court's offense at the
defendant's blatantly sexual lyrics. Moreover, it seemed concerned that
those lyrics would tarnish the image of the copyright holder's wholesome
and patriotic song, which, the court said, "achieved its greatest popularity
during the tragic and unhappy years of World War II, in which 292,131
Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 477-78 (2d Cir. 2004); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 8o6
(9th Cir. 2003).
288. See Bohannan, supra note 76, at 1022-27 (comparing copyright dilution and trademark
dilution, and arguing against copyright dilution in favor of a harm-based approach to fair use); see also
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § I125(c)(I) (2000), superseded by
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of zoo6, Pub. L. No. 109-312, i2o Stat. 1730, 1730-32 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(c) (2006)).
289. 677 F.2d 18o (2d Cir. 1981).
290. Id. at 184.
291. See id. at i85 (expressing concern that allowing such uses "would be an open-ended invitation
to musical plagiarism").
292. See id. at x85-87.
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Americans lost their lives."' Thus, the court concluded, "We are not
prepared to hold that a commercial composer can plagiarize a
competitor's copyrighted song, substitute dirty lyrics of his own, perform
it for commercial gain, and then escape liability by calling the end result
a parody or satire on the mores of society."2 94
The Copyright Act's explicit protection for reputation-related harm
is very limited. Unlike the Lanham (Trademark) Act, whose broad cause
of action against trademark dilution enjoins tarnishing the image of
famous trademarks, 295 the Copyright Act protects against this type of
harm only in its moral rights provisions in the Visual Artists Rights Act
(VARA).2 96 VARA moral rights provide authors with a right of
attribution (the right to be recognized as the author of a work), as well as
a right to "prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of [a] work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor
or reputation."2 97
Arguably, the moral right against distortion of artistic works
impedes artistic discourse by preventing artistic modifications that the
artist finds objectionable.298 Thus, that right itself may conflict with the
right to speak under the First Amendment.'" Yet, unlike the right to
copy and the other exclusive rights granted by the Act, VARA's moral
rights are very limited in scope. They apply only to "work[s] of visual
art," which include paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and
photographs, "existing in a single copy ... [or] in a limited edition of 200
copies or fewer."3 m Thus, moral rights apply only to fine art and not to
more common types of works like books or music,30 ' which are more
often the subject of parodies and satires. Moreover, these rights apply
only to original works or limited edition copies and not to copies
generally. As such, the right against "distortion, mutilation, or other
modification" would seem to protect only against modifications of a
particular physical copy, not against modifications of the underlying
293. Id. at 184 & n.I.
294. Id. at 185.
295. See Ch. 54o, 6o Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
296. 17 U.S.C. §§ 105, so6A (2006).
297. Id. § iol.
298. See Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 263, 265 (2009) (arguing that the
moral right of artistic integrity is at odds with artistic practice and threatens to disrupt artistic
discourse).
299. See Remarks of Rebecca Tushnet in Symposium Panel Discussion, Copyright and Freedom of
Expression, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 319. 336 (2007) ("[The] moral right against distortion .. . poses the
prospect of very direct conflicts with the First Amendment.").
3oo. 17 U.S.C. § roi (defining "work of visual art").
301. See id. ("A work of visual art does not include . ., any poster. map, globe, chart, technical
drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine,
newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar
publication. .. )
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intangible work. Given the apparent conflict between moral rights and
speech, as well as all of the carefully articulated limitations on moral
rights in § io6A, it seems highly unlikely that Congress would have
intended for courts to protect against reputation- or image-related harm
through other doctrinal means, such as fair use analysis.
A good deal of case law in both the First Amendment and copyright
areas also shows that it would be inappropriate to recognize harm to
reputation or image in copyright infringement cases. To the extent that
copyright infringement actions burden speech in order to protect against
harm to image or reputation, they allow an end-run around important
requirements intended to reduce burdens on speech in defamation law.
First, it is fairly obvious that defamation provides a cause of action for
reputational harm to people, not reputational harm to books, movies, or
Barbie dolls. Second, liability for defamation requires publication of
statements that are false. Indeed, at least with regard to defamation of
public figures-and many of the copyright holders in infringement suits
are public figures-falsity is a constitutional requirement. As the
Supreme Court has explained, "Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
we have consistently ruled that a public figure may hold a speaker liable
for [a defamatory statement] .. . only if the statement was made 'with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not."'3 2
Copyright infringement cases-including cases in which the
defendant's use puts the copyrighted work in a negative light-rarely
involve false statements of fact about the work, or its author, publisher,
or other copyright holder. Rather, these cases typically involve the use of
a copyrighted work in order to convey an idea or opinion, such as to
ridicule or comment upon some aspect of the copyrighted work or an
associated message. This difference is crucial from a First Amendment
perspective. As the Supreme Court said in Gertz: "Under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."
303
Accordingly, First Amendment case law treats parodies and other
forms of critical opinion very differently than false assertions of fact. For
example, in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, Jerry Falwell, a nationally
known religious figure and political commentator, sued Hustler
Magazine and its editor, Larry Flynt, for libel and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.30 4 The claim arose out of the defendants' publication
of a parody advertisement that portrayed Falwell having sex with his
302. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (3988) (citation omitted) (quoting N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)).
303. 418 U.S. 323, 3394o (197~4
304. See 485 U.S. at 47-48.
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mother in an outhouse.0 ' With regard to the libel claim, the Court
accepted the jury's verdict for Flynt and the magazine, which was based
on the jury's finding that the "parody could not 'reasonably be
understood as describing actual facts about [Falwell] or actual events in
which [Falwell] participated."'"0 Likewise, with regard to the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim, the Court held that "public figures
and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at
issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false
statement of fact."" As the Court explained, "[T]he fact that society may
find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed,
if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a
reason for according it constitutional protection."
The Supreme Court has specifically addressed the issue of
reputation-related harm only once in copyright law. In Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the rap group 2 Live Crew made a rap version of
Roy Orbison's song Oh, Pretty Woman." 2 Live Crew's song
incorporated the melody, opening line, and guitar riff from the original
song, but replaced the original sentimental lyrics with sexually suggestive
lyrics that reflected "the ugliness of street life."3 o The Court held that 2
Live Crew's song "reasonably could be perceived" as a parody of the
original song3"' and therefore was entitled to the same fair use protection
as other forms of transformative commentary or criticism."
Moreover, the Court concluded that the fourth factor of fair use
analysis, harm to "the market for or value of the copyrighted work,"313
does not include the loss of sales or license fees for parodies of the
305. Id. at 48.
3o6. Id. at 57 (quoting App. to Petition for Certiorari at Ci, Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. 46 (No. 86-
1278)).
307. Id at 56.
308. Id. at 55 (alteration in original) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726. 745-46 (1978)).
The Court did note that this principle is subject to some limitations, among others a previous holding
that "vulgar, offensive, and shocking [speech] is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection
under all circumstances." Id. at 56 (quoting Pacifica Found, 438 U.S. at 747 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
309. See 51o U.S. 569, 572 (1994).
310. Id. at 583. Although, like Orbison's original, the 2 Live Crew version began with a chorus
about a "pretty woman," it went on to reference a "big hairy woman," a "bald headed woman," and a
"two timin' woman." Id at 595-96. At the appellate level, Judge Nelson in his dissent stated that the 2
Live Crew song "was clearly intended to ridicule the white-bread original." Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v.
Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1442 (6th Cir. 1992) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
311. See Campbell, 5io U.S. at 583-
3I2. See id. at 579 ("Suffice it to say now that parody has an obvious claim to transformative
value . .. . [IUt can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process,
creating a new one.").
313. Id. at 570.
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copyrighted work.314 The Court gave two related reasons for this
conclusion. First, the market harm factor of fair use takes into account
only the harm of "displacement" and not the harm of "disparagement.""
That is, market harm considers only the harm that results when the
defendant's work "usurps" demand for the plaintiff's work, not the harm
that results when the defendant's "[b]iting criticism. . . suppresses [that]
demand.""' Second, a defendant's parody does not usurp the copyright
holder's market for parody because copyright holders do not control the
markets for parodies and other criticism of their works. The Court
explained:
The market for potential derivative uses includes only those that
creators of original works would in general develop or license others to
develop. Yet the unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will
license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes
such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market. "People
ask ... for criticism, but they only want praise."317
The Court's conclusion-that harm resulting from criticism of
copyrighted works is not cognizable harm under the Copyright Act-
may be viewed as an attempt to use and define a harm requirement so as
to protect free speech concerns in copyright infringement cases. The
Court essentially held that the type of harm that results from criticism of
a copyrighted work may not be considered in infringement, even if the
criticism damages the original artist's reputation. Although the Court did
not explicitly rely on the First Amendment in its analysis, it seemed
intent on enhancing the marketplace of ideas by protecting the freedom
to express unflattering opinions of the work of others.
Yet if the Court was truly concerned with protecting speech in
copyright infringement cases, its opinion did not go nearly far enough. It
falls short in at least two important ways. The first is that the Court's
reasoning is vulnerable to manipulation by copyright holders. The Court
stated that copyright holders do not control the markets for parody and
other forms of criticism because those are not markets that copyright
holders "would in general develop or license others to develop." 3' This
would seem to be primarily an empirical observation that might be
subject to change as copyright holders adapt their marketing strategies.
As Lemley has suggested, it would not take a savvy copyright holder long
314. Id. at 592.
315. See id
316. See id. at 591-92 (first alteration in original) (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th
Cir. 1986)) ("[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the original, it
does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.").
317. See id. at 592 (alteration in original) (quoting W. SOMERSET MVAUGHAM, Or HUMAN BONDAGE




to decide that if a parody is going to be made without her consent, she
might as well license it so that she can at least share in the profits.'
If copyright holders can gain control over parody and other forms of
criticism merely by entering the market for such uses, the result could
undermine the First Amendment goal of encouraging competition in the
marketplace of ideas. Rather, the First Amendment should inform the
definition of harm in fair use analysis by putting affirmative limits on the
markets that copyright holders can control. Once certain markets are
excluded in light of overarching constitutional values, reasonable
copyright holders will no longer expect to control those markets. Thus,
even if a copyright holder has attempted to license her copyrighted work
for purposes of parody or criticism, another's unauthorized use of the
work for such purposes should not be deemed to harm the copyright
holder's legally protected markets. If no other harm is evident, or if the
value of the use outweighs any other harm, the use should be deemed
noninfringing.
The second way that the Campbell Court's decision fails to provide
sufficient First Amendment protection for uses of copyrighted works
arises from its treatment of satirical uses. While the Court held that fair
use protects parody as transformative criticism or commentary, it
suggested that satire is not as deserving of fair use protection13
Distinguishing the two art forms, the Court defined parody as criticism of
a particular work, and satire as criticism of a broader genre of works or
of society at large that "has no critical bearing on the substance or style
of the original composition."32' Because satire does not directly criticize
the copyrighted work itself, the Court presumably thought (albeit with
little evidentiary support) that copyright holders would be more willing
to license their works for satirical purposes than for parodic purposes.
The Court's distinction between parody and satire is very
problematic from a First Amendment perspective. First, by granting
greater fair use protection for parody than for satire, the Court reverses
traditional First Amendment priorities. First Amendment protection is at
its zenith with respect to speech that contributes to democratic
319. See Lemley, supra note 78, at 190i-9 ("Once courts announce that a copyright owner can stop
uses of their work merely by offering to charge for those uses, it is reasonable to expect that copyright
owners will strive to develop just such a licensing market. And indeed they have done so. Not only has
the market for photocopy permissions skyrocketed, but copyright owners are charging for rights to
home viewing of television programs, rap-music samples, and even the right to parody their works."
(footnote omitted)).
320. Campbell, 5io U.S. at 58o.
32!. Id. The Court also explained that parody, unlike satire, "needs to mimic an original to make
its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim's (or collective victims') imagination,"
id. at 580-81, but admitted that this "fact . . . does not, of course, tell either parodist or judge much
about where to draw the line," id. at 581.
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governance.322 As such, First Amendment case law has always given
primacy to speech relating to matters of public importance.323 By
contrast, the Court's hierarchy of parody over satire privileges
commentary on trivial or whimsical matters over commentary on broader
political and social issues. For instance, in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., the defendant wrote a book entitled The Cat
Not in the Hat! that criticized the O.J. Simpson murder case and the
justice system's handling of that case.324 In writing the book, the
defendant copied Dr. Seuss's image of the Cat in the Hat and mimicked
his lyrical style of story-telling.3 " Applying Campbell's parody/satire
distinction, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant's work was not fair
use because it was a satire of the Simpson case rather than a parody of
the Dr. Seuss books.2 Yet, given the First Amendment's emphasis on
protecting speech regarding matters of public importance, it would seem
that commentary on the legal system's handling of the most controversial
murder case in years should receive greater protection than commentary
on a book of children's rhymes.
Moreover, Campbell's distinction between parody and satire is
likely to have a chilling effect on speech because in many cases it is
nearly impossible to tell the difference between the two. Indeed, the
Campbell Court itself acknowledged the blurriness of the lines,
conceding that "parody often shades into satire when society is
lampooned through its creative artifacts."" As such, even those who
wish to make parodies will be deterred by the specter of litigation and
the uncertainty in how a court would characterize their use.
Allowing copyright holders to suppress opinions and artistic
expression in order to maintain their image would fly in the face of the
First Amendment's purpose to foster a robust and diverse marketplace
of ideas. Copyright law can be reconciled with the First Amendment by
defining harm in keeping with this purpose. Thus, outside the context of
the narrow moral rights under VARA, courts should not recognize harm
to image or reputation in copyright infringement cases.
322. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
323. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533-34 (2ooi) (explaining that the challenged
statute "implicates the core purposes of the First Amendment because it imposes sanctions on the
publication of truthful information of public concern"); cf Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation
Enters., 417 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (reasoning that, although the plaintiff's copyrighted material was of
great public importance, the First Amendment did not militate toward finding fair use where the
defendant's use merely supplanted the plaintiff's intended use).
324. 1o9 F.3d 1394, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1997).
325. See id.
326. See id. at 14o1.
327. 51o U.S. 569, 58i (1994); see also Bohannan, supra note 76, at 1oo9 (arguing, for example, that
"any parody of Gone With the Wind would seem to satirize the antebellum South, because images of
Gone With the Wind practically define that era in the minds of many readers").
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C. NONMARKET HARM: THE RIGHT NOT TO SPEAK OR ASSOCIATE
AND THE RIGHT AGAINST COMPELLED USES OF PROPERTY
A copyright holder might also assert that unauthorized copying of
his copyrighted work harms his First Amendment right not to speak or
associate with another's message.' As the Supreme Court held in
Wooley v. Maynard, "the right of freedom of thought protected by the
First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all."329
As the Wooley Court indicated, however, the right not to speak
applies only against state action. When there is no state action, there
might be involuntary speech, but there is no government-compelled
speech. Although a full discussion of the state action doctrine is beyond
the scope of this Article, it is important to note how different views of
state action affect recognition of a copyright holder's right not to speak.330
The Supreme Court has held that state action occurs only when the state
affirmatively acts, and not when the state merely acquiesces in private
action.33' Under this narrow view, it seems that the First Amendment
would not require copyright law to intervene to protect a copyright
holder from another private party's unauthorized use of her copyrighted
material. This would be true even if that use intrudes upon the copyright
owner's property or extracts a subsidy to support the other's speech
(unless the First Amendment requires the existence of a copyright law in
the first place, a truly novel proposition). Yet, the Court's decisions on
state action have not always been consistent.' Thus, a few notable cases
328. For convenience, "the right not to speak" will be used hereafter to refer generally to both the
right not to speak and the right not to associate with another's message.
329. 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977) (holding that state law punishing drivers for covering up state
motto "Live Free or Die" on automobile license plate violated appellee's right not to speak). See
generally Corbin, supra note 17 (arguing that the same principles underlying the right against
compelled speech support recognition of a First Amendment right against compelled listening);
Robert C. Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician
Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 939, 946-47 (discussing compelled physician speech under Wooley).
330. I am indebted to David McGowan for pointing out how critiques of state action doctrine
affect this argument.
331. For example, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, embraced this narrow view of state
action in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks:
It would intolerably broaden ... the notion of state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment to hold that the mere existence of a body of property law in a State, whether
decisional or statutory, itself amounted to "state action" even though no state process or
state officials were ever involved in enforcing that body of law.
436 U.S. 149, 16o n.io (1978). Professor Paul Brest has argued that Justice Rehnquist's "tenacious
adherence to both the state action doctrine and an extreme form of constitutional positivism" has
produced a public/private distinction that is "at best meaningless and at worst a vehicle for
manipulating outcomes to suit the Justices' distributive tastes." See Paul Brest, State Action and
Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 13or-o2 (3982).
332. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note i6, at 5xo ("rI]t must be recognized that there are
inconsistencies and tensions among the decisions in this area, especially the cases concerning the
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have held that state judicial enforcement of private agreements or
common law rights constitutes state action.333 It is even possible to argue
that there is state action when the state merely permits private action by
making the decision not to intervene.334 Under this broader view of state
action, if the state permits a private party to use copyrighted material
without permission, then there could be state action necessitating further
consideration of whether that use violates the copyright holder's right
not to speak.
Although it seems unlikely that state action would encompass the
government's mere refusal to prevent private unauthorized uses of
copyrighted material, we will proceed on the assumption that the state
action doctrine does not preclude the copyright holder's assertion of the
right not to speak. As others have noted, the distinction between state
action and inaction is somewhat elusive and therefore provides a
questionable basis for denying constitutional protections."' Furthermore,
state action is a prerequisite only in First Amendment adjudication. If
courts continue to use copyright's statutory doctrines instead of direct
First Amendment scrutiny to protect speech in copyright cases, the state
action doctrine will not apply. In such cases, courts might recognize
competing speech claims between the parties, whether or not those
claims would satisfy all constitutional requirements. Thus, the plaintiff
exceptions.").
333. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (state court enforcement of libel
action between private parties constituted state action); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18 (1948)
(state court enforcement of racially restrictive covenant prohibiting the sale of private property to
blacks constituted state action). See generally Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SC. Q. 470, 471 (1923) (arguing that there is state coercion in
protecting private property rights because the state is not only passively "abstaining from interference
with the owner when he deals with the thing owned," but also actively "forcing the non-owner to desist
from handling it").
334. Cf Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-85 (1980) (implying that decision of
California Supreme Court granting private citizens the right to picket in privately-owned shopping
centers constituted state action); see also Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 887
(1987) (discussing difficulty of distinguishing between state "action" and "inaction," and arguing that
"[t]he cases confirm that the state action inquiry is not a search for whether the state has 'acted,' but
instead an examination of whether it has deviated from functions that are perceived as normal and
desirable"). Scholars have made this assertion on both positivist and realist grounds. See, e.g., Brest,
supra note 331, at 1301 ("The doctrine of state action is an attempt to maintain a public/private
distinction by attributing some conduct to the state and some to private actors.. .. [S]ince [under
positivism] any private action acquiesced in by the state can be seen to derive its power from the state,
which is free to withdraw its authorization at will, positivism potentially implicates the state in every
'private' action not prohibited by law."); David McGowan, Some Realism About the Free-Speech
Critique of Copyright, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 435, 440-41 (2005) ("Part of realism denied any natural
distinction between public and private action. Any activity involving law is affected by state action,
especially the assertion of rights under such 'private' laws as contract and property. . . . A strong
version of this view is that the state has presumptive power to control whatever behavior it wants to
control, and therefore can fairly be charged with acting to regulate a given situation, whether or not it
decides to intervene overtly.").
335. See supra note 334-
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would raise the right not to speak as a counterargument to the
defendant's right to speak. For instance, in Harper & Row, the Supreme
Court weighed the copyright holder's right not to speak in its fair use
analysis.336 In that case, the defendant, a private news magazine,
surreptitiously obtained and published the copyright holder's
unpublished manuscript.3 Although no state action was evident, the
Court characterized the copyright holder's right not to speak as a First
Amendment "value" weighing against a finding of fair use.338
A copyright holder might argue that a defendant's unauthorized
copying of her copyrighted material violates her right not to speak under
either of two lines of cases. In the first line of cases, the Supreme Court
has held that there is no First Amendment right to use another's
property for speech. In the other line of cases, the Court has held that the
First Amendment prevents the state from forcing a person to subsidize a
cause or message with which she disagrees.
First, a copyright holder might argue that the unauthorized use of
her copyrighted work forces her to allow her property to be used for
another's speech purposes. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, the Supreme Court
held that the First Amendment does not require a private shopping-
center owner to grant access to persons exercising their constitutional
rights of free speech when adequate alternative avenues of
communication exist.339 Moreover, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission of California, the Court held unconstitutional a
utility commission regulation requiring a private utility company to
include a public interest group's message along with its billing
statements.3 40 The Court reasoned that such "compelled access" violates
the First Amendment because it "forces speakers to alter their speech to
conform with an agenda they do not set." 34' Similarly, the Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston decision, although
not involving the use of property in the traditional sense, invalidated a
state public-accommodations law insofar as it required parade organizers
to allow a gay and lesbian rights group to march in their parade, on the
ground that the law required the organizers "to alter the expressive
content of their parade." 342
336. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
337. Id. at 542.
338. See id. at 559-60 (noting that the First Amendment freedom of expression "includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all" and pointing out that copyright law,
particularly the right of first publication, serves "this countervailing First Amendment value" (quoting
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,714 (977))).
339. 407 U.S. 551' 570 (1972).
340. 475 U.S. I, 20 ('986).
345. Id. at 9.
342. 515 U.S. 557' 572-73 (i995) ("Since every participating unit affects the message conveyed by
the private organizers, the state courts' application of the statute produced an order essentially
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Significantly, however, the Court has also held that the First
Amendment does not prevent the government from passing a law
requiring a property owner to allow such use so long as (i) the property
is not within the exclusive personal control of the property owner (i.e., is
accessible to the public); and (2) the law does not violate the Takings or
Due Process Clauses. Thus, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, the
Court held that a California court ruling did not violate the First
Amendment in allowing protestors the right to use shopping centers for
speech purposes.343 The Court reasoned that the protestors' views would
"not likely be identified with those of the owner" because the shopping
centers were not within the exclusive personal control of the property
owner but were open to the public, and because the owners could inform
the public (by signs or otherwise) that they did not necessarily support
the protestors' message. 3"
Moreover, the Pruneyard Court held that the state law requiring the
property owner to allow access did not constitute a taking or a
deprivation of property without due process. The Court explained that
"it is well established that 'not every destruction or injury to property by
governmental action has been held to be a "taking" in the constitutional
sense."' 3 45 Rather, the takings analysis requires "inquiry into such factors
as the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations."346 The
Court concluded that the law requiring the property owners to allow
access for speech purposes clearly did not violate the Takings Clause
because the owners "failed to demonstrate that the 'right to exclude
others' is so essential to the use or economic value of their property that
the state-authorized limitation of it amounted to a 'taking."'
347
Following the Supreme Court's reasoning in these cases, a copyright
holder's First Amendment right against compelled use of her property
should be protected, if at all, only where the copyrighted work was
unpublished at the time of the unauthorized use. Prior to publication, the
work presumably remains under the exclusive personal control of the
copyright holder. During that time, the First Amendment protects her
requiring petitioners to alter the expressive content of their parade.").
343. 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
344. Id. at 87; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association,
Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 641, 645 n.21 (2ooi) ("[Pruneyard] upheld the power of California to
require the owners of large shopping centers, private in title but public in function, not to interfere
with the political messages that those lawfully on the premises choose to disseminate.").
345. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 82 (quoting Anmstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960)).
346. Id. at 83.
347. Id. at 84 (recognizing a relationship between the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments,
and suggesting that the First Amendment issue in a case like Pruneyard is less compelling where the




right to develop and refine her own message prior to communicating it to
the world as well as the right to decide against communicating it
altogether.34' Thus, unauthorized publication of a previously unpublished
work forces the copyright holder to "speak" against her will. Existing fair
use doctrine provides appropriate (though not necessarily sufficient)
protection for the right not to speak by affording much less latitude to
copy from unpublished works.349
The copying of published works does not raise the same First
Amendment concerns. A copyright holder's publication of her work is a
voluntary communication of the work and a declaration that the message
of that work is complete. Moreover, once the work is published, it is no
longer under the exclusive personal control of the copyright holder. As
such, when another uses the work to convey a new or different message,
there is no reason to believe that that message will be imputed to the
original copyright holder. The copyright holder can also disclaim any
connection with the use of her copyrighted work if she so chooses. In
addition, when there is no demonstrable market harm, it would be
virtually impossible to show that a use of copyrighted material
constitutes a taking or due process violation. Accordingly, unless the
defendant has taken affirmative steps to mislead the public as to the
copyright holder's sponsorship or affiliation with the defendant's use, the
use should not be deemed to harm the copyright holder's right not to
speak.
This is as far as the First Amendment goes in protecting a copyright
holder's right not to speak. Although some copyright holders might
prefer for their original message to stand alone or superior, and therefore
might like the right to prevent their works from being associated with
other messages, there is no basis in the First Amendment for granting
them such a right. Rather, as we saw in the previous section, the
protection of copying in order to convey a new meaning or message,
especially a critical message, is necessary to the First Amendment goal of
facilitating diverse viewpoints in a robust marketplace of ideas. Indeed,
copyright law is in accord with the First Amendment on this point: With
regard to published works, fair use traditionally has protected uses of
copyrighted material that convey a new or different message (i.e.,
transformative uses) even-or especially-when the message is one that
the copyright owner would find objectionable. In particular, fair use
348. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 572-73
(1995) (holding that parade organizers have First Amendment right to shape the message of their
parade by deciding which groups to include or exclude); Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters.,
47! U.S. 539, 56o (1985) (holding that copyright right of first publication supports First Amendment
right against compelled speech).
349. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., Slo U.S. 569, 586 (1994); Harper & Row, 471
U.S. at 539; NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 480 (2d Cir. 2004).
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favors the use of a copyrighted work for purposes of comment or
criticism, as in a book review or parody, even if the use puts the work in a
negative light. 50 Thus, fair use would seem to grant the greatest
protection for uses of copyrighted material with which copyright owners
would least like to be associated.
In another line of cases involving an individual's right not to speak,
the Supreme Court has found a violation of the First Amendment when
the state compels a person to pay money to support a cause or message
with which she does not agree.35 1 Here, copyright holders might argue
that unauthorized or uncompensated uses of their copyrighted works
effectively force them to subsidize another's message. Nimmer once
invoked a forced subsidy argument to reject a First Amendment right to
copy in copyright law, arguing that "[t]he first amendment guarantees the
right to speak; it does not offer a governmental subsidy for the speaker,
and particularly a subsidy at the expense of authors whose well-being is
also a matter of public interest."352
Yet, a copyright holder provides a subsidy only where she gives up
something that she otherwise would have received but for the
defendant's use of her copyrighted material. Where there is no
demonstrable harm to the copyright holder, there is no subsidy. To be
sure, the defendant benefits from using the copyrighted work even if the
copyright holder gives up nothing, and one could perhaps argue that such
a benefit to the defendant constitutes a subsidy from the copyright
holder, regardless of whether it makes the copyright holder worse off.
But the subsidy argument proves too much, for it would lead to the
untenable conclusion that everyone who contributed unknowingly or
unwillingly to the defendant's use-right down to the people who
unwittingly inspired him to write-could claim that their right not to
speak was violated. The argument is merely another manifestation of the
circularity of harm in copyright, in which any benefit to the defendant is
deemed harm to the plaintiff. 353
350. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92 (fair use analysis favors transformative uses and does not
take into account harm due to "disparagement" but only harm due to "displacement").
351. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1990) (holding that compulsory State Bar
dues may be used to pay for Bar-related activities, such as disciplining members of the Bar, but not to
advance ideological causes unrelated to regulating the legal profession); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (holding that union may require payments from both members and
nonmembers to subsidize collective bargaining activities from which they benefit, but may not require
payments to subsidize ideological causes unconnected to the union's duties as bargaining
representative).
352. Nimmer, supra note i, at 1203 (emphasis added).
353. See, e.g., supra Part IIA; see also Shubha Ohosh, Decoding and Recoding Natural Monopoly,
Deregulation, and Intellectual Property, 2008 ILL. L. Ray. II25, 1164 ("A well-known critique of fair
use is that the methodology tends to be circular when lost licensing revenues are considered a harm to
the intellectual property owner's market that militates against fair use.").
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Accordingly, in cases involving the use of published copyrighted
works, courts should not recognize harm to the copyright holders right
not to speak in the absence of demonstrable economic harm to the
copyright holder. Significantly, this analysis suggests that a court should
not penalize a defendant for using a published copyrighted work in a
market that the copyright holder either had decided not to exploit or
otherwise was unlikely to exploit, even though it might be argued that
the copyright holder chose not to speak or associate in that particular
way with those particular consumers.
The Seinfeld case provides an example of a court that decided this
issue incorrectly.354 The court acknowledged evidence showing that the
copyright holders had decided not to exploit the market for trivia books
based on the Seinfeld television show.355 Nevertheless, the court decided
that it should "respect" the copyright holders' right not to enter that
market and found liability despite the lack of any market harm. " But
because the copyrighted Seinfeld television episodes were published, the
defendant's use would not have affected the copyright holders' right not
to speak. The copyright holders had already distributed the work
publicly, so unlike in Harper & Row, there was no concern that the
defendant's copying would divulge material that the copyright holder
had not yet decided to share. Moreover, under Pruneyard, there is no
reason to think that the message of the trivia books would be attributed
to the copyright holders. The copyrighted works were known to be
accessible to the public, and the copyright holders easily could have
disavowed any connection to the trivia books by, for example, issuing a
press release or including a statement on their website or in their
authorized works to that effect. Alternatively, the court could have
required the defendant to include a statement with its trivia book
indicating that the copyright holders had not approved of and were in no
way affiliated with the defendant's work, rather than holding the
defendant's work infringing. Given the absence of either market or
nonmarket harm, it is clear that the court's decision unnecessarily
burdened harmless speech.
D. NONMARKET HARM: VIOLATIONS OF PRIVACY
Copyright holders might also attempt to argue a privacy right
against unwanted publicity caused by unauthorized uses of their
copyrighted works. Based on the following cases addressing the
appropriate balance between one person's speech and another's privacy,
however, it is clear that copyright infringement generally does not cause
354. See Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
355. See id. at 345.
356. See id. at 346.
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sufficient harm to privacy interests to justify prohibiting allegedly
infringing speech.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, Life magazine ran a story suggesting that a
new, fictional play was based on the real-life experience of the plaintiff
Hill's family, who had been held hostage in their home by escaped
convicts.' In fact, the play was based only in part on the family's
experience and differed in many respects. Foremost, while no one was
harmed in the family's real experience, the play showed the father and
son being beaten and the daughter being subjected to a verbal sexual
insult."
The plaintiff brought an action for unwanted publicity under a New
York privacy statute. The statute prohibited "us[ing] for advertising
purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of
any living person without having first obtained the written consent of
such person."359 The New York state appellate division sustained the trial
court's finding of liability. It explained: "Although the play was
fictionalized, Life's article portrayed it as a re-enactment of the Hills'
experience. It is an inescapable conclusion that this was done to advertise
and attract further attention to the glay, and to increase present and
future magazine circulation as well."3 The New York Court of Appeals
affirmed.3 '
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Although the Court
noted that New York judicial decisions had limited causes of action
under the statute by providing that "truth is a complete defense," it held
that the falsity requirement alone was not sufficient to safeguard First
Amendment guarantees.362 Thus, the Court held that the Sullivan
requirement of actual malice-knowled e or reckless disregard of
falsity-should also apply to privacy cases.3
The Court's decision is highly relevant to assessing the harm that
unwanted copying might cause to copyright holders' privacy interests.
The Court essentially held that the privacy interest in avoiding unwanted
exposure, including exposure for another's commercial gain, is
insufficient to warrant limiting speech unless the speech is false and is
made with knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsity. The Court said
that the fact that "books, newspapers, and magazines are published and
sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression
357. 385 U.S. 374, 376-78 (1967).
358. See id. at 378.
359. Id. at 376 n.i (quoting N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § So).
360. Id. at 379.
361. Id.
362. See id. at 382-83, 387 88.
363. See id. at 387-88 (concluding that the First Amendment protections of both speech and the
press precluded application of the challenged statute, at least absent proof that defendant knowingly
or recklessly disregarded its falsity).
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whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment.""'6 Moreover,
although the case involved news reporting on a matter of public interest,
the Court's reasoning would extend to all kinds of expression, including
many, if not most, uses of copyrighted works. As the Court explained,
"The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political
expression or comment upon public affairs .... One need only pick up
any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of published
matter which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens and
public officials."365 Furthermore, the Court observed that the right of
privacy is inherently limited by the First Amendment, stating, "Exposure
of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a
civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of
life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and
of press."366 Thus, the Court held that people who live in society must
accept some amount of unwanted and unauthorized exposure. The right
of privacy, as informed and limited by the First Amendment, does not
permit people to meter or control exactly the amount of publicity they
receive, especially when they become a focus of public interest. This is
true even when others impose unwanted publicity for their own
commercial gain.
The same rule should apply to copyright cases in which the
defendant free-rides on a copyrighted work but the copyright holder
cannot show any economic harm. In these cases, the copyright holder
might argue a privacy-based interest in metering or controlling the
precise amount of exposure that her copyrighted work receives.36 Time
holds that there is no absolute right against such unwanted publicity, and
its reasoning would apply with even greater force in most copyright
cases. First, as was previously discussed, copyright infringement cases
typically do not involve false assertions of fact but rather the use of a
copyrighted work to convey opinions or ideas. Opinions and ideas are
entitled to much greater protection under the First Amendment than
false factual assertions, especially because they are often matters of
public interest. Second, the privacy interest at stake in most copyright
cases is less weighty than in a case like Time. Except in cases involving
unpublished works, the nature of the interest at stake in copyright
infringement cases is more of a commercial interest against free-riding
than a privacy interest in avoiding public exposure of one's personal
affairs and life experiences. Moreover, the copyright holder has already
364. Id. at 397 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952)).
365. Id. at 388.
366. Id.
367. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. W. Highland Publ'g, Inc., No. 98 L 4091, 1998 WL 698922, at *x6 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 5, 1998) (owner of copyrights in Beanie Babies stuffed animals attempted to maintain long-tern
value of the collectibles by restricting short-term availability and exposure).
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made the decision to go public, so that any additional "invasion of
privacy" is likely to be marginal.
The Supreme Court's decision in Florida Star v. B.J.F likewise
precludes recognizing a privacy-based right in copyright holders to
prevent otherwise harmless uses of their copyrighted works. 6 8 There, the
Court held that First Amendment protection extended to truthful but
unauthorized publication of a rape victim's name in a widely-circulated
newspaper."' The plaintiff had filed a police report alleging that she had
been robbed and raped by an unknown assailant.370 A reporter lawfully
obtained a copy of the police report and copied its information, including
the victim's full name, into a short article in the "Police Reports" section
of the paper.37' The plaintiff then sued under a Florida privacy statute
that made it unlawful for any person to "print, publish, or
broadcast... in any instrument of mass communication the name,
address, or other identifying fact or information of the victim of any
sexual offense."37 2
The Court held that the statute violated the First Amendment.373 It
emphasized that "state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of
the highest order."374 Applying this principle, the Court examined the
three government interests behind the statute: "the privacy of victims of
sexual offenses; the physical safety of such victims, who may be targeted
for retaliation if their names become known to their assailants; and the
goal of encouraging victims of such crimes to report these offenses
without fear of exposure."375 While acknowledging that "these are highly
significant interests," the Court held that the statute was not necessary to
further those interests in that particular case.376 One of the Court's main
objections to the statute was that it did not require "case-by-case
findings" regarding the harm caused by the invasion of privacy but rather
imposed liability broadly, based solely on the fact of publication. Thus,
the statute essentially presumed harm from the publication "regardless
of whether the identity of the victim is already known throughout the
community; whether the victim has voluntarily called public attention to
368. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
369. Id. at 527-29.
370. Id. at 527.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 526 n.i (quoting FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1987)).
373. Id.
374. Id. at 533 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g, Inc., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
375. Id. at 537.
376. Id. While the Court did not preclude the possibility that, "in a proper case," imposing liability
for publishing a rape victim's name might be "overwhelmingly necessary," it declined to do so in the
case at bar, reasoning that its circumstances did not justify such an "extreme step." See id.
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the offense; or whether the identity of the victim has otherwise become a
reasonable subject of public concern."377
If First Amendment concerns are weighty enough to prevent courts
and legislatures from presuming harm to privacy from the publication of
a rape victim's name, then surely courts should not presume similar harm
from the copying of copyrighted material. There are many more
situations in which copying does not harm copyright holders than there
are situations in which publishing a rape victim's name does not harm the
rape victim. It also seems fairly obvious that the harm to copyright
holders, when it does occur, is much less severe than the harm to rape
victims. Just as the First Amendment required a showing that application
of the Florida Statute was necessary to remedy harm to the governmental
interests in protecting rape victims in Florida Star, so too it requires a
showing that application of the Copyright Act is necessary to remedy
harm to the governmental interest in encouraging the production and
dissemination of copyrighted works.378
Moreover, it is significant that the Court suggested it would not find
a violation of privacy for unwanted publicity where the identity of the
victim was already known or where the victim had already "voluntarily
called public attention to the offense."3 79 In those cases, the harm
associated with the unwanted publicity would not be substantial enough
to outweigh First Amendment protection of comment on news events.
Likewise, in most copyright cases-again, except those involving
unpublished works"'-the copyright holders have already chosen to
expose their works to public comment. The Florida Star case indicates
that the additional publicity associated with that particular use probably
would not cause harm sufficient to justify prohibiting it.
In summary, in order to satisfy First Amendment concerns,
copyright law must require a likelihood of real harm in copyright
infringement cases. As the foregoing sections show, copyright harm
clearly includes the harm of market substitution, where the defendant's
use of plaintiff's copyrighted material actually supplants the market for
377. Id. at 539.
378. It is perhaps worth noting that both Florida Star v. B.IF, 491 U.S. 525, and Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing, 443 U.S. 97, involved content-based speech restrictions and were therefore subject to
strict scrutiny. As I have argued, copyright law is arguably an analogous content-based law. See supra
notes 124-34 and accompanying text. Moreover, even if copyright law is content-neutral, it requires
similar (though perhaps less demanding) consideration of harm to government interests. Indeed, in
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 524, 527-28 (2001), which involved a content-neutral speech regulation,
the Court referred to the Smith and Florida Star decisions for guidance in evaluating the
constitutionality of the speech regulation.
379. Florida Star, 49! U.S. at 539.
380. See generally Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 8ss F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that
biographer's use of unpublished letters belonging to reclusive writer J.D. Salinger did not constitute
fair use).
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the copyrighted work in a way that is likely to decrease economic
incentives to create or distribute the work. By contrast, the First
Amendment severely limits judicial recognition of nonmarket harms.
Thus, courts may not recognize harm to reputation caused by criticism or
disparagement. Furthermore, except in cases involving the copying of
unpublished works, courts ordinarily should not recognize harm to the
plaintiff's right not to speak or to privacy.
VI. SUMMARY OF REFORMS AND FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
First, and in summary, the First Amendment requires proof of harm
for copyright infringement. Yet it permits courts to recognize only
certain kinds of harm in copyright infringement cases. In cases
challenging the use of unpublished works, courts may recognize harm to
the copyright holder's privacy or right not to speak. Courts should view
uses of unpublished works very skeptically, maintaining the current rule
that such uses will ordinarily be deemed infringing.
In all other cases, courts should recognize harm only when copyright
holders suffer monetary loss of a nature that is likely to decrease ex ante
incentives to create or distribute copyrighted works. The harm must be
real and not merely speculative, just as it is required to be in other cases
involving speech. A court should find liability for copyright infringement
only if, as in Zacchini, the defendant's use directly impacts the plaintiff's
ability to create or distribute her work by supplanting the market for it.38'
On the other hand, a court should find that the First Amendment trumps
infringement where, as in the Eighth Circuit's fantasy baseball case, the
defendant has engaged in copying of a kind or amount that is unlikely to
decrease the plaintiff's incentives.38 ' Thus, courts should not find
copyright infringement when the only apparent harm is the inability to
obtain a license fee for use of a work in a remote market. As we have
seen, the First Amendment requires (at the least) that speech regulations
be justified by an important government interest, and narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest. As such, it allows the government to grant
copyright holders "sufficient incentives" but not "perfect control."3'
381. See 433 U.S. 562, 563-64 (1977).
382. See C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d
8i8, 820 (8th Cir. 2007). The right-of-publicity cases provide a useful illustration, as they are very
similar to copyright infringement cases. As the Zacchini Court noted, the governmental interest
behind both laws is to compensate people in order to give them incentives to produce works or
performances that are of interest to the public. See 433 U.S. at 576. Moreover, rights of publicity and
copyrights are potentially more detrimental to speech than other laws like defamation because they
prohibit speech even when it is not false or misleading. See Lemley & Volokh, Injunctions, supra note
i, at 227.
383. See Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGs L.J. 433, 434 (2007)
(quoting Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, II ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 635, 638
(1996)) (discussing the need to give copyright holders "sufficient incentive" but not "perfect control").
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Copyright harm must also take into account (i.e., be offset by) any
increased profits that the copyright holder enjoys as a result of the
alleged infringement. This approach follows the Court's admonition in
Zacchini that the "human cannonball" petitioner would have to show net
harm because it was possible that "respondent's news broadcast
increased the value of petitioner's performance by stimulating the
public's interest in seeing the act live." 3 4If there is no provable net harm
once offsetting gains have been taken into account, then there is no
government interest in suppressing the speech.
Moreover, to the extent that courts have begun to emphasize
transformativeness over harm, they should reverse that trend. The
transformativeness of the defendant's use is relevant to whether the use
supplants the market for the copyright holder's work and also to whether
the value of the defendant's work outweighs harm to the copyright
holder. But transformativeness should not be required where the
copyright holder cannot show harm. Where there is no harm, there is no
sufficient government interest in suppressing the defendant's use,
regardless of whether the use is transformative.
Second, the burden of proof on harm must be assigned
appropriately. Where the defendant engages in close copying of the
plaintiff's work in the plaintiff's most foreseeable markets, harm to the
copyright holder's incentives can probably be presumed. In all other
infringement cases, however, the plaintiff (as the proponent of the
speech restriction) must bear the burden of proof to show harm, just as
plaintiffs typically bear the burden of proof to show harm in other types
of speech cases.3"5 This allocation of the burden of proof is consistent
with direct First Amendment scrutiny. But even if courts assess harm as
part of fair use analysis, this allocation probably would not require
statutory amendment. As was previously noted, the Copyright Act does
not characterize fair use as an affirmative defense but simply says that
fair use "is not an infringement of copyright."
Third, where possible, damages in copyright infringement claims
should be commensurate with actual harm in order to avoid unnecessary
burdens on speech. First Amendment scrutiny already limits damages in
this way. As the Court made clear in Gertz, "the States have no
substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs . . . gratuitous awards of
money damages far in excess of any actual injury."386 In addition, the
language of the Copyright Act's damages provision permits this
384. 433 U.S. at 575 n.12.
385. For a somewhat similar approach to copyright infringement based on an antitrust model, see
Christopher Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of Reason, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 317,
324-25 (2oo9), which argues that copyright cases should be divided into "per se" and "rule of reason"
infringement categories.
386. 418 U.S. 323, 349 (i 9 74).
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approach in most cases. Because § 504(a) allows the copyright holder to
recover her "actual damages and any additional profits of the
infringer," 8 7 it may be read to mean that the copyright holder is entitled
to recover the infringer's profits only where there are actual damages.
This view would require infringers to disgorge only those profits resulting
from harmful acts of infringement. The effect would be to discourage
only harmful speech. On the other hand, because the statutory damages
provision grants an award of damages within a fixed statutory range,3 it
might have to be amended to allow statutory damages only where the
infringement is harmful. Statutory damages would continue to be
important where the fact of harm is clear but the precise amount is
difficult to prove.
CONCLUSION
As copyright law restricts more and more uses of copyrighted works,
it encroaches upon the ability of others to express themselves through
the use of those works. Yet courts generally do not apply First
Amendment scrutiny in copyright cases. Copyright law thus exists as an
anomaly within First Amendment law, which generally holds that the
government may not prohibit speech without a showing that the speech
causes harm. While other speech-burdening laws, such as defamation and
right-of-publicity laws, require a showing that the plaintiff has suffered or
is likely to suffer harm as a result of the speech, copyright law does not
make harm a requirement of infringement. Although copyright law
considers harm to the market for the copyrighted work as a factor in fair
use analysis, harm is not always required and is poorly defined.
Moreover, the defendant bears the burden of proof to show the absence
of harm in most cases.
The reasons for ignoring speech concerns in copyright law are inapt
and unpersuasive. Copying involves speech as well as conduct, and the
fact that copyrights can be viewed as property does not justify their
exceptional treatment. Moreover, copyright's role as the "engine of free
expression" does not obviate First Amendment concerns. Rather, it
provides a way to reconcile copyright law and free speech. By requiring
real harm to the copyright holder's incentives, and defining harm so as to
be consistent with First Amendment principles, copyright law can
enforce copyrights where necessary to serve its incentive purpose while
avoiding unnecessary burdens on harmless speech.
387. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2oo6) (emphasis added).
388. See id. § 504(b) (copyright holder entitled to statutory damages "in a sum of not less than $750
or more than $30,000 as the court considers just," but the court may increase the maximum award to
$350,000 in cases of willful infringement or decrease the minimum to $200 in cases of innocent
infringement).
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